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This Article argues that the ethics of responsibility should be hailed as
an intrinsic value undergirding copyright law. It considers how and why
copyright law should be reformed to embrace a strong vision of copyright
holders’ responsibilities. To this end, it calls for a more dynamic vision re-
garding the nature of copyrighted works. A copyrighted work, as the Article
shows, is not only the embodiment of its author’s thought and personality,
but also a social initiative in sharing intangible resources to promote creativ-
ity, shaping people’s cultural power, and pursuing the quest for justice.
These social values inherent in all copyrighted works provide the ethical
justification for introducing responsibility into copyright and enforcing it as
another core function of copyright law. Following the ethics of responsibil-
ity, copyright law should function to grant exclusive rights to copyright
holders and also to impose social responsibilities on them.
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What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility—a recognition
on the part of every American that we have duties to ourselves, our nation
and the world; duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize
gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the
spirit, so defining of our character than giving our all to a difficult task.
Barack Obama1
At the root of America’s economic crisis lies a moral crisis: the decline of
civic virtue among America’s political and economic elite. . . . Without




Copyright law has long been dominated by the language of rights. The
building blocks of the copyright system are designed to protect copyright
owners’ rights.3  However, legislators, judges, and policymakers rarely raise
the question whether copyright owners should have responsibilities and how
copyright law should enforce them. For example, amid the heated debate on
the Google digital library project, few have asked whether copyright holders
should have the responsibility to facilitate the creation of a public digital
library. Given its unprecedented power to disseminate knowledge, the
Google digital library project has been hailed as equivalent to the invention
of the printing press.4 Yet, because the operation of its digital library in-
1 President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) (tran-
script available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address).
2 Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Price of Civilization: Reawakening American Vir-
tue and Prosperity 3 (2012).
3 See, e.g., Carys J. Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture: To-
wards a Relational Theory of Copyright Law 2–3 (2011) (“[C]opyright is widely
regarded as a system whose purpose is the protection of private, proprietary
rights.”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a
Moral Rights Law for the United States xiii (2010) (arguing that “copyright
laws . . . are concerned generally with authors’ rights.”); Robert P. Merges, Jus-
tifying Intellectual Property 5 (2011) (arguing that “the most important core
principle” of property rights over intangible assets such as copyright is this: “[I]t
assigns to individual people control over indivdiual assets. It creates a one-to-one
mapping between owners and assets.”); Christopher Kalanje, Leveraging Intellectual
Property: Beyond the ‘Right to Exclude’, World Intell. Prop. Org., http://www.
wipo.int/sme/en/documents/leveraging_ip.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (argu-
ing that the core of real property and intellectual property is the right to exclude).
4 Mark Gregory, Google’s Books Online under Fire, BBC News (May 24, 2005),
http:// http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4576827.stm (“The head of Oxford Uni-
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volved unauthorized verbatim copying of copyrighted works, Google was
sued for copyright infringement.5  Since then, the debate has been focused
squarely on issues such as whether Google’s digital library could constitute a
fair use of copyrighted works6 and the validity of its dispute settlement
agreement.7 No serious discussion, however, has been raised to consider
whether copyright holders have a social responsibility to assist in the crea-
tion of a public digital library.
The handling of the dispute between copyright holders and Google,
therefore, reveals the lack of the principle of responsibility in the contempo-
rary copyright system. Armed with the bundle of economic rights protected
by copyright law, many copyright holders have taken for granted that they
do not have responsibilities associated with their copyrights. For them, cop-
yright simply denotes the absolutist notion of property, in which the owner
enjoys “sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.”8
This Article seeks to address the irresponsibility mentality that modern
copyright law has bred. To this end, it considers why the ethics of responsi-
bility should be hailed as an intrinsic value undergirding copyright law.
Following the ethics of responsibility, it argues that copyright law should
function to grant exclusive rights to, and also impose social responsibilities
on, copyright holders.9 It shows that the imposition of responsibilities on
copyright holders stems from the human condition, namely that individuals
are members of social groups. While copyrights play a crucial role in foster-
ing a copyright holder’s individuality, responsibilities are indispensable to a
versity’s library service said the [Google] project could turn out to almost as impor-
tant as the invention of the printing press.”).
5 Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20,
2005).
6 See, e.g., Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual,
55 N.Y.L Sch. L. Rev. 19 (2010) (arguing that the Google Books Library Project
constitutes fair use); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can Our Culture Be Saved? The
Future of Digital Archiving, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 989, 1018–25 (2007). For the opinion
holding that the Google project can not pass the fair use scrutiny, see Elisabeth
Hanratty, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, 2005 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 10, ¶ 3
(“Without a significant change in interpretation of the law, it is unlikely that
Google will be able to successfully claim its actions constitute fair use. . . .”); Siva
Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and the Future of Copyright, 40 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1207, 1221–25 (2007).
7 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Google Books Search Settlement as Copyright Re-
form, 2011 Wisc. L. Rev. 479 (evaluating the validity of the settlement agreement).
8 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 393 (1882).
9 See infra Part III.
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copyright holder’s social membership. This Article argues that imposition of
responsibilities plays three roles in nurturing the copyright holder’s social
membership: overcoming individualism, shaping cultural power, and induc-
ing moral deliberation about social justice.10
The responsibility-based idea put forward by this Article makes two
contributions to the copyright literature. First, the ethics of responsibility,
as this Article will show, paves the way for us to reconsider the conventional
wisdom about the nature of copyright law, which emphasizes the exclusive
rights bestowed upon the individual copyright holder11 or the duties of
others not to infringe those rights.12 In this Article, I argue that these con-
ceptions of copyright law neglect the ethical ethos on which copyright hold-
ers’ responsibilities should be based. The protection of copyright holders’
rights is not and should not be the sole function of copyright law. Copyright
law should be re-envisioned as a legal system that embodies the interrelated
values of individual right (the copyright holder’s right), collective right (the
user’s right),13 and responsibility (the copyright holder’s responsibility).
10 See infra Part II.
11 The primary function of copyright law, according to the law and economics
perspective and natural rights theory, is to grant and protect copyright holders’
rights. Professors Landes and Posner, two pioneers of the economic analysis of copy-
right law, define copyright protection as “the right of the copyright’s owner to
prevent others from making copies. . ..” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326 (1989) (empha-
sis added). By prioritizing the legal protection of the individual labor or personhood
that is injected into copyrighted works, natural rights theorists have highlighted
the role of copyright law in protecting copyright as an individual right. See generally,
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1544–1555 (1993);
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy Of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287,
296–306 (1988); William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays In
The Legal And Political Theory Of Property 168, 171–72 (Stephen R. Munzer
ed., 2001).
12 Professor Balganesh puts forth that the core function of copyright law is to
enforce users’ duty not to copy. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of
Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1664, 1665
(2012).  He argues that copyright law’s “exclusive rights framework functions al-
most entirely through its creation of an obligation not to copy original expression.”
Id. at 1665. He further points out that “accepting that copyright’s legal frame-
work—as an obligatory system—speaks most directly to potential copiers rather
than to creators.” Id. at 1665–66.
13 See Haochen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 125, 164
(2011). Other commentators have argued the case for including users’ rights in
copyright law. However, they do not define the nature of the user’s right as a collec-
tive right. See generally L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Na-
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In addition to the above proposal, I further argue that the strategies
that make copyright law more accommodative to the ethics of responsibili-
ties should also be used to reshape the Copyright Act into a more socially
viable legal instrument.  Recently, leading copyright scholars such as Profes-
sors Jessica Litman,14 William Patry,15 and Pamela Samuelson,16 have
demonstrated the urgency of, and made concrete proposals for, amending
the Copyright Act, as it has become copyright holder-centric, obsolete, and
over-complicated in the digital age. While I concur with these proposals, in
this Article I put forward a new direction in which the reform of copyright
law should proceed.  I consider why the law should require copyright hold-
ers to take affirmative actions to address responsibilities that ought to be
within the ambit of copyright law. Such a critical assessment would contem-
plate the renewed moral sentiments and political environment necessary to
make copyright law adequately responsive to societal needs.17
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I reveals a pervasive irre-
sponsibility mentality among many copyright holders. It further examines
the roots of the irresponsibility mentality. Part II considers the ethical basis
for imposing responsibilities on copyright holders. It shows that a copy-
righted work is not only the embodiment of its author’s thought and per-
sonality, but also a social initiative in sharing intangible resources to
promote creativity, shaping people’s cultural power, and pursuing the quest
ture Of Copyright: A Law Of Users’ Rights 3–4 (1991) (stating that copyright
should be viewed “as a law for consumers as well as for creators and marketers”);
Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 347
(2005); Abraham Drassinower, Taking User Rights Seriously, in In The Public In-
terest: The Future Of Canadian Copyright Law 462 (Michael Geist ed., 2005);
Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1119 (2007) (discussing the rights of information consumers); Wendy J.
Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public’s Rights to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid
the “Fared Use” Fallacy, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 619 (2007); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright
Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 397 (2003).
14 Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 16 (2010) (discuss-
ing the weaknesses of the copyright system).
15 William Patry, How to Fix Copyright (2012).
16 Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on a Copyright Reform Project, 2007
Utah L. Rev. 551 (2007).
17 See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 332 (2006) (“We should
not fear the rise of new theoretical justifications for creating intellectual property
rights—or for limiting them. There is much to be gained from articulating compet-
ing descriptive and normative visions of intellectual property, particularly those
that challenge the historical distribution of the power to make and control cultural
meaning.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLS\4-2\HLS201.txt unknown Seq: 7 11-SEP-13 8:59
2013 / Copyright and Responsibility 269
for justice. It then argues that copyright law should have dual functions:
protecting copyright holders’ rights and enforcing their responsibilities.
Part III further explores the extent to which the ethics of responsibility
can be translated into legal rules in copyright law. It shows that this transi-
tion should involve two crucial steps of implementation. First, legislators
and regulators should promote the responsibility policy among copyright
holders.  In particular, they can use the responsibility policy to deal with the
limitations on the extent to which the First Amendment and the Copyright
Clause of the U.S. Constitution can protect the public interest in accessing
copyrighted works. Second, the fair use exception should be redefined as a
copyright holder’s responsibility to accommodate fair uses of his or her
works.  Part III also discusses the specific negative and collective responsi-
bilities that should be imposed on copyright holders.
I. THE IRRESPONSIBILITY MENTALITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Law protects rights, but it also enforces responsibilities. It regulates
human affairs through rules that require people to enjoy their freedoms and
exercise their rights in responsible ways.18
For example, property law has a body of doctrines that require property
owners to act responsibly toward their neighbors and the public at large.19 It
prohibits a property owner from causing both private nuisances that would
interfere with another owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property and public
nuisances that would harm the public interest.20  Other property doctrines,
18 See Jules L. Coleman, Beyond the Separability Thesis: Moral Semantics and the
Methodology of Jurisprudence, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 581, 584 (2007) (“Law
regulates human affairs by rules that are reasons for acting. In that sense, governance
by law necessarily respects the capacity of those to whom its directives are addressed
to act on the basis of reasons.”).
19 Property law has expressly embraced the ancient maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas (“use your land in such a way as not to injure the land of others”) as a
guiding principle in addressing property disputes. See Elmer E. Smead, Sic Utere Tuo
Ut Alienum Non Laedas: A Basis of the State Police Power, 21 Cornell L. Q. 276, 277
(1936). Professor Alexander argues that “[m]odern property law imposes a wide
range of obligations on owners.” Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in
American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 754 (2009).
20 Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property 105–21 (2001) (ex-
plaining private and public nuisance doctrines as limitations on property rights that
enforce property owners’ responsibilities). Property law penalizes owners of factories
that pollute water and/or air in an entire community, motels that serve as site for
prostitution or lewd dancing, stores that sell pornography, and houses in which
illegal drugs are sold. In these cases, public nuisances caused by irresponsible uses of
property “injuriously affec[t] the safety, health, or morals of the public . . . .”
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such as the eminent domain power21 and the public trust doctrine,22 are also
designed to promote responsible property use.  Interestingly, a vibrant dis-
cussion about the idea of responsibility has flourished in property literature,
directing people to re-envision the role of property protection in fostering
social dynamics.23
Copyright is one facet of property law, which as a system is designed to
entitle owners to have exclusive control over tangible and intangible re-
sources. However, the corresponding idea of responsibility is poorly incorpo-
rated into copyright law. Copyright statutes and judicial decisions rarely use
responsibility as a guiding principle for dealing with copyright disputes.
Worse still, only scant attention has been paid to the copyright holder’s
responsibilities in the vast copyright literature.24 Professor Jacqueline Lipton
is one of the few scholars who argues that, “governments who create, sup-
port, and enforce information property,” should also, “create, support, and
enforce concurrent affirmative duties imposed on relevant right holders.”25
She advocates using lessons from property law to impose duties on copyright
holders.26 But copyrights differ from real property rights: the former protect
the intangible expression of ideas while the latter protect tangible objects.
Thus, questions still remain as to why the obligatory scheme in property law
Commonwealth v. S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 205 S.W. 581, 583
(1918).
21 See Alexander, supra note 19, at 775 (justifying the government’s eminent do-
main power to force the sale of private property by regarding the eminent domain
power as “an aspect of the social obligation inherent in private ownership.”).
22 See Haochen Sun, Toward a New Social-Political Theory of the Public Trust Doc-
trine, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 563, 603 (2011) (arguing that the public trust doctrine “relies
on social responsibilities that promote the stewardship ethic to protect collective
rights over public space.”).
23 See, e.g., Eric t. Freyfogle, On Private Property: Finding Common
Ground on the Ownership of Land (2007); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Land We
Share: Private Property and the Common Good (2003); Joseph William
Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (2000); Laura S. Underkuf-
fler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (2003); Alexander, supra note
19, at 775; Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 Rev. Const.
Stud. 1, 16 (1994); Eduardo M. Pen˜alver, Property as Entrance, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1889
(2005); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradi-
tion for New Debates, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1237 (2005).
24 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Author as Steward “For Limited Times,”
88 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 705 (2008) (reviewing Lior Zemer, The Idea of Author-
ship in Copyright (2007), and pointing out that “the concept of ‘duty’ is not one that
has received explicit attention in copyright circles . . . .”).
25 Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 Fla. L.
Rev. 135, 190 (2004).
26 Id. at 165–81.
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should be necessarily introduced into copyright law. Professors Roberta Ro-
senthal Kwall27 and David Vaver28 also discuss the possibility of channeling
responsibility into copyright law and emphasize the value of responsibilities.
But, they do not explain the larger theoretical basis, in particular the ethical
justification, for imposing responsibilities on copyright holders.
The underutilization or near absence of responsibility in the theory and
practice of copyright law and ethics has bred a widespread irresponsibility
mentality29 among many copyright owners. Owners actively assert their
copyrights, but barely talk about their responsibilities. William Patry, a
leading scholar and practitioner in copyright law, bluntly describes the irre-
sponsibility mentality as follows:
Copyright owners . . . only speak in terms of the advantage of property
rights, and never the burdens that necessarily go with property ownership.
Such cherry-picking of only those things that you like isn’t the way our
legal system works. . . . Although copyright owners routinely invoke prop-
erty as “one of the basic tenets of a free society,” they ignore the more
fundamental tenet—the obligation of all citizens, including copyright
owners, to society. . . . Copyright owners also ignore that what they regard
as a right is instead a government grant specifically for the benefit of soci-
ety, not authors.30
The above statement demonstrates the fact that responsibility has be-
come a “sunset” concept in the realm of copyright law and ethics.  This
section first discusses three examples of the irresponsibility mentality in
which copyright owners use the language of rights and its rhetorical power
to water down their responsibilities. The remainder of this section then ex-
27 Kwall, supra note 24, at 703–04 (elaborating on an understanding of “the
colloquial author as a steward of her work,” and suggesting that this understanding
is “consistent with the view that copyright ownership involves duties to the public
as well as rights in the work.”).
28 David Vaver, Copyright and the Internet: From Owner Rights and User Duties to
User. Rights and Owner Duties?, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 731, 750 (2007) (“We
should recognize that copyright owners have duties as well as rights. Among these
duties are the provision of fair access to content at fair and non-discriminatory
prices.”).
29 See generally Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitima-
tion of Human Suffering 72 (2007) (emphasis in original) (“Immunised by the
mechanisms of responsibility transference, underpinned by the naturalised economic
realm of rights to private property upheld at almost any cost by state institutions,
the irresponsible mentality appears not only as widely prevalent, but as legitimate.
And such organized irresponsibility and legitimised immunities are call ‘the
law.’”).
30 William Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars 123 (2009).
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plains what factors have operated to condone or even encourage the irrespon-
sibility mentality among many copyright owners.
A. Three Examples of the Irresponsibility Mentality of Many Copyright Owners
1. Expanding Copyrights
Copyright-based industries have strived to strengthen copyright pro-
tection during the past few decades. Their aggressive lobbying efforts have
led Congress to repeatedly amend the Copyright Act. For example, the Cop-
yright Term Extension Act (CTEA)31 epitomizes how the copyright-based
industry has been expanding the scope of copyrights.32 In 1998, Congress
adopted the CTEA to give a twenty-year extension of copyright terms pro-
spectively and retroactively. The retroactive extension of copyright terms, in
particular, has pulled the works that were already or about to be out of
copyright protection back under proprietary control.33 If the extension had
not been made, these contents traditionally recognized as public property34
would have remained free for the public to use.
31 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 108, 203, 301–04
(2006)).
32 See Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Crea-
tivity 218 (2005) (noting that more than two-thirds of the original sponsors of
CTEA in the House and Senate received contributions from Disney and that “Dis-
ney is estimated to have contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns
in the 1998 cycle.”); Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, 30 U. Mem. L. Rev. 363, 385–86 (2000) (“In fact, ten of the thirteen sponsors
of the bill in the House received contributions from Disney, and eight of the twelve
sponsors in the Senate were given money by Disney’s political action committee.
Disney also made a $20,000 donation to the National Republican Senatorial Com-
mittee two weeks after Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott signed the bill. Other
notable lobbyists included the Gershwin family, whose copyright on George Gersh-
win’s ‘Rhapsody in Blue’ was due to expire in 1999, and other acclaimed artists like
Bob Dylan and Quincy Jones.”).
33 Under the retroactive extension, works copyrighted in 1923 and timely re-
newed will not enter the public domain until 2018, assuming there are no further
extensions.
34 See, e.g., Merriam v. Holloway Pub. Co., 43 F. 450, 451 (1890) (“When a man
takes out a copyright, for any of his writings or works, he impliedly agrees that, at
the expiration of that copyright, such writings or works shall go to the public and
become public property . . . .”); Merriam v. Famous Shoe & Clothing Co., 47 F.
411, 413 (1891) (“[A]s the copyright on that edition has expired, it has now be-
come public property. Any one may reprint that edition of the work . . . .”).
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The passage of the CTEA evinced the irresponsibility mentality cham-
pioned by the copyright-based industry. Throughout its legislative history,
the Congressional hearings were dominated by pro-copyright testimonies.
The representatives from copyright-based industries argued for the extension
of copyright terms by twenty years based on a need to provide economic
incentive to produce and disseminate new works and to keep up with the
term extension in the European Union.35 The legislative process of the
CTEA, however, showed that its extension of copyright terms was adopted
purely to benefit existing copyright holders, especially big entertainment
companies.36 Heavily influenced by the rhetoric for stronger copyright pro-
tection, Congress did not consider whether the CTEA would substantively
serve the public interest. Testimonies delivered before Congress were
predominantly from representatives sent by the copyright-based industry
who failed to furnish any evidence the CTEA would provide creators more
incentive to produce and disseminate more works for the public.37 A brief
signed by seventeen economists, including five winners of the Nobel Prize
in Economics, however, shows that the copyright-based industry had indeed
exaggerated the role of copyright term extension in incentivizing the pro-
duction and dissemination of works. The brief concludes that there was no
plausible claim that the twenty-year extension of the copyright term would
do anything to incentivize the creation of works.38  Moreover, multiple stud-
ies have found that the CTEA may cause grave social harms.39 For example,
35 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199–208 (2003).
36 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 32, at 218.
37 See Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation,
36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 199, 206–222 (2002) (concluding after review of the CTEA’s
legislative history that “[a] number of witnesses before Congress stated, in essence,
that an extended term meant stronger copyright protection and that stronger pro-
tection would operate as an incentive to the creation of new works. No witnesses
attempted to rebut the argument that the present value of the extended term to a
current author is nil. No one testified that any particular author had decided against
undertaking the creation of a new work that he would have undertaken had the
prospective term been life plus seventy years instead of the pre-CTEA life-plus-50-
year term.”).
38 Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
10–12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/legal.html#amici.
39 Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict Competition and Creativity
Excessively?, The Becker-Posner Blog (Sept. 30, 2012, 10:30 PM), www.becker-
posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrict-competition-and-
creativity-excessively-posner.html (“Apart from the fact that the present value of
income received so far in the future is negligible, obtaining copyright licenses on
very old works is difficult because not only is the author in all likelihood dead, but
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many economists have estimated that the CTEA would give rise to monopo-
listic control of information and thereby increase “the social cost of
monopoly.”40
By aggressively lobbying Congress to pass the CTEA, the copyright-
based industry turned a blind eye to the social costs of the twenty-year ex-
tension of copyright terms. Their irresponsible assertion has made the
length of copyright protection the most serious problem in copyright law.41
2. Narrowing Copyright Limitations
Copyright law itself contains safeguards aimed at preventing absolute
protection of private ownership. By and large, these safeguards carve out
limitations on the exclusive rights vested in creators. For example, the fair
use doctrine allows the public to use reasonable portions of works for pur-
poses such as “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research.”42 In addition, compulsory licensing schemes adopted in the U.S.
Copyright Act allow relevant members of the public to use copyrighted
works for statutorily designated purposes without their copyright holders’
authorization, provided that users pay appropriate fees to copyright hold-
ers.43 Moreover, the first sale doctrine limits a copyright holder’s right to
control distribution of copies of the copyrighted work after they are sold to
consumers. For instance, it allows purchasers to dispose of lawful copies in
whatever fashion they wish, including by destruction, resale, donation, or
lease.44 The rationale for the doctrine is “to prevent the copyright owner
from restraining the free alienability of goods.”45
While these safeguards do provide necessary breathing room for the
public to use knowledge and information contained in copyrighted works,
the copyright-based industry has stepped up efforts to narrow these limita-
tions on copyright, curtailing the power of copyright limitations to con-
strain the exercise of copyrights. The passage of the Digital Millennium
his heirs or other owners of the copyright may be difficult or even impossible to
identify or find.”).
40 See, e.g., Akerlof et. al., supra note 38, at 10.
41 Posner, supra note 39 (“The most serious problem with copyright law is the
length of copyright protection, which for most works is now from the creation of
the work to 70 years after the author’s death.”).
42 17 U.S.C. § 107.
43 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 118 (describing the use of copyrighted works in noncom-
mercial broadcasting).
44 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
45 Marshall A. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law, § 8.14[A], 310 (3d
ed. 1999).
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Copyright Act (DMCA)46  illustrates the aforementioned problem. Mainly
demanded by the copyright-based industry, the DMCA was designed to sig-
nificantly undercut the ability of copyright limitations to protect the public
interest.47 Take the doctrine of fair use as an example. Fair use presupposes
that the public at large first has free access to works and then makes deci-
sions regarding whether they need to make fair uses.48  Free access to works
shielded by technological measures, however, is no longer available for users
under the DMCA. This is because the technological measures deployed by
copyright holders fence them off from unrestricted access to works and the
DMCA furnishes penalties against circumvention of those “digital fences.”
The DMCA further bars the manufacture and distribution of devices that are
capable of circumventing these technological measures.49 By limiting free
access, the DMCA has made it more difficult for the public to make fair use
of works.50 While the copyright-based industry single-mindedly pushed
Congress to pass the DMCA to strengthen copyright protection for their
works, it ducked the issue as to whether the DMCA could seriously jeopard-
ize the role of copyright limitations in promoting the free-flow of informa-
tion and knowledge.
3. Exaggerating Copyrights
Many copyright holders have intentionally made extravagant copyright
claims, overreaching the legitimate scope of their copyrights. Now seen as
“copyrightfraud,”51 this type of irresponsible action takes the following four
forms. First, there are copyright holders who have claimed copyright over
uncopyrightable public domain materials. Copyright law only protects
46 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
47 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 69 (2008) (arguing that
the DMCA “lays the legal groundwork for copyright holder control—over copying
as well as access—untrammeled by the exceptions and limitations that are supposed
to apply the copyright holder’s rights”)
48 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23
Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 137, 140 (1999) (observing that “it may be fair use to make
nonprofit research photocopies of pages from a lawfully acquired book; it is not fair
use to steal the book in order to make the photocopies.”).
49 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)(A) (2006).
50 See e.g., Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use, 40
Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 40 (2002).
51 Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other Abuses of Intellectual Prop-
erty Law (2011).
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works for a limited period of time. The term of copyright protection expires
seventy years after the death of the author, making works public domain
materials free for all to use from that point onward. However, publishers
have claimed copyright over materials that are, by any reasonable person’s
view, public domain materials. For example, publishers have affixed copy-
right notices on books containing reprints of William Shakespeare’s plays,
The Federalist, and Charles Dickens’s, Jane Austen’s, and Benjamin Frank-
lin’s writings.52 The copyright notice routinely suggests that no part of
those books may be reproduced without the prior written permission of the
publisher.53 The same has occurred in the modern reprints of many other
public domain works, such as sheet music and government documents.54
This problem is becoming worse in the digital environment. Although the
Copyright Office has made it clear that “digitization . . . does not result in a
new work of authorship,”55 copyright claims still have appeared frequently
in the public materials that are digitized. For instance, ProQuest offers a
subscription-based service containing digital versions of newspapers from
the nineteenth century to the present. It affixes a copyright notice on every
single newspaper page reproduced in its database.56
Second, invalid copyright claims have also been used as a means of
stifling competition. The notice-and-takedown system created by the
DMCA allows copyright holders to send notices to Internet service providers
such as Google, YouTube, and Facebook to take down the holders’ works
posted by users online without their permission. One study found that fifty-
five percent of takedown notices sent to Google involved businesses target-
ing their competitors,57 and another study found that thirty percent of the
notices included no valid copyright claim.58
Third, invalid copyright claims have also been used as a means to sup-
press speech. For example, Diebold, Inc., a manufacturer of electronic voting
machines, sent many takedown notices to Internet service providers hosting
leaked internal emails that revealed problems in Diebold’s voting machines.
The court concluded that “[n]o reasonable copyright holder could have be-
52 Id. at 9.
53 Id. at 9–10.
54 Id. at 10–11.
55 Id. at 11.
56 Id. at 11.
57 Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Take-
down Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 621, 651 (2006).
58 See also Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. Telecomm. &
High Tech. L. 101, 114 (2007).
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lieved that the portions of the email archive discussing possible technical
problems with Diebold’s voting machines were protected by copyright.”59
Diebold had, therefore, knowingly used takedown notices when it knew that
infringement had not occurred.
Fourth, many copyright holders have routinely exaggerated the scope
of their economic rights as a way to prevent the public from making a fair
use of their works. For example, the cautionary notice—“No part of this
book can be reproduced without the permission of the publisher”—appears
in almost every book published. Publishers also routinely limit users by
stating that users may quote no more than a specified limited number of
words, lines, or paragraphs from the book.60 It seems that these publishers
have turned a blind eye to the fair use doctrine, which sets no fixed limit on
the amount users can copy and in fact allows the public to reproduce por-
tions, or even the entire content, of the work.61
Similarly, big entertainment companies have exaggerated their eco-
nomic rights and turned a blind eye to the fair use doctrine. In one case, in
September 2007, Stephanie Lenz made a home video of her 13-month-old
son dancing to “Let’s Go Crazy” by Prince. Lenz posted the video on You-
Tube in order to share it with her family and friends.62  The video was
twenty-nine seconds in length, and the song can be heard for approximately
twenty seconds. Four months after the video was originally uploaded, Uni-
versal Music Group, which owned the copyrights to the song, ordered You-
Tube to remove the video. However, Universal used the notice-and-
takedown procedure without taking account of Lenz’s fair use right. De
minimis use of this kind is routinely deemed fair use.63 Thus, Universal
59 Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
60 Stephen Fishman, The Copyright Handbook: How To Protect & Use
Written Works 256 (9th ed. 2005) (“[A]lthough there is no legally established word
limit for fair use, many publishers act as if there were one and require their authors
to obtain permission to quote more [than] a specified number of words (ranging
from 100 to 1,000 words).”).
61 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (holding that ex-
tensive copying for the purpose of parody is fair use); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984) (holding that verbatim copying
for time-shifting purposes is fair use).
62 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
63 See Netanel, supra note 47, at 62 (“Under [the de minimis] doctrine, trivial
copying of minute portions of existing works is deemed noninfringing despite nom-
inally constituting fragmented literal similarity.”).
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“acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper considera-
tion of the fair use doctrine.”64
B. The Roots of the Irresponsibility Mentality
This section argues that the irresponsibility mentality was largely
caused by the contemporary mode of the copyright system, in which legal
norms primarily function to protect copyrights.65 The prevailing language
in copyright law emphasizes the bundle of rights enjoyed by creators of
works and those who acquire copyrights from original creators (like publish-
ers).66 Due to this rights-based view, copyright owners enjoy absolute con-
trol of rights over their copyrighted works and possess the power to give
others permission to use their works. For example, Blackstone claimed that
an author “has clearly a right to dispose of [his work] as he pleases, and any
attempt to take it from him, or vary the disposition he has made of it, is an
invasion of his right of property.”67
When individual rights occupy the center of the structure of copyright
law, they are apt to prevail over the responsibilities that limit the ways in
which copyright holders can exercise their bundle of rights. As Susan Sell
points out, “The language of rights weighs in favor of the person claiming
the right. The language of privilege weighs in favor of the person granting
the privilege.”68
64 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–55; see Mom Sues Universal Music for DMCA
Abuse, Elec. Frontier Found. (July 24, 2007), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2007/07/mom-sues-universal-music-dmca-abuse (“Universal must stop making
groundless infringement claims that trample on fair use and free speech.”) (quoting
Electronic Frontier Foundation Staff Attorney Marcia Hoffman).
65 See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 3, at xiii (“[I]n many countries, copyright laws,
which are concerned generally with authors’ rights, emphasize author autonomy,
personal connectedness to one’s original work, and the integrity of the author’s mes-
sage through a doctrine known as moral rights.”); Merges, supra note 3, at 5 (“The
most important core principle of the institution of [intangible] private property is
this: it assigns to individual people control over individual assets. It creates a one-
to-one mapping between owners and assets.”);  Kalanje, supra note 3 (arguing that
the core of real property and intellectual property is the right to exclude).
66 See articles cited in footnote 3.
67 William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England 400,
405–06 (1766).
68 Susan K. Sell, The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights 51
(2003). As James Boyle points out, under the romantic vision of authorship,
“[a]uthors tend to win,” because this vision “provides economic analysis with at
least the illusion of certainty.” James Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens:
Law and the Construction of the Information Society 116 (1996). Mark Lem-
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As a result, the prevalence of the language of rights in copyright law
gives copyright holders considerable room in which they can constantly
highlight the need to protect their rights and duck any issues concerning
their responsibilities. The remainder of this section will show the ways in
which the use of the language of rights by the copyright-based industry has
led legislators and judges to make a series of decisions that strengthen copy-
right protection and dismiss copyright holders’ responsibilities.
First, the dominance of the copyright-based industry in the legislative
process has persistently enlarged the scope of copyright owners’ exclusive
rights, giving them more power to tighten up the flow of informational
resources. At the same time, the legislature has narrowed the limitations on
those exclusive rights, which previously gave room for the public to use
information contained in copyrighted works.
Second, the legislative expansion of copyright protection has been
made without sufficient consideration of the social costs imposed on the
public’s access to and use of informational resources. In many cases, the leg-
islative proposals submitted by industry lobbyists were overwhelmingly
adopted by Congress without close scrutiny of their impact on public inter-
ests or close examination of viewpoints opposed to those held by copyright-
based industries. “Congress in effect agreed that if the industry representa-
tives would invest the time and energy to develop a bill that all of them
endorsed, Congress would refrain from exercising independent judgment on
the substance of the legislation.”69 In this one-sided process, many legisla-
tors have been preoccupied with the rhetoric that the stronger copyright
protection would necessarily give copyright holders stronger economic in-
centive to produce and disseminate works, resulting in increased numbers
and availability of works for the public. Yet, many legislators routinely shy
away from asking whether this incentive-based assertion is plausible or not.
Therefore, it is not surprising that legislative expansions of copyright “often
ley also notes that current trends in copyright law are “heavily skewed to protect
the interests of corporations, not individual authors.” Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 87/3, 882 (1997).
69 Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Or. L. Rev.
275, 314–15 (1989) (footnotes omitted). Professor Litman also points out that
“[m]uch legislation advances the agendas of private interest groups.” Id. at 314; see
also Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L.
Rev. 857, 860–61 (1987) (“Indeed, the statute’s legislative history is troubling
because it reveals that most of the statutory language was not drafted by members of
Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, the language evolved through a process of
negotiation among authors, publishers, and other parties with economic interests in
the property rights the statute defines.”).
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consist of outright congressional rubber-stamping of industry-drafted legis-
lative and committee reports.”70
Third, on the judicial side, many courts have not yet actively champi-
oned the ethics of responsibility. Instead, they have given strong support for
the individualist notion of property that divorces the exclusive rights en-
joyed by copyright holders from any responsibilities they ought to fulfill.
For example, a federal district court asserted that “[c]opyright and trade-
mark law are not matters of strong moral principle,” but instead “economic
legislation based on policy decisions that assign rights based on . . . what
legal rules will produce the greatest economic good for society as a whole.”71
The quest for efficiency, as the court emphasized, is important. Yet the di-
vorce of moral principles from the copyright adjudication process allows
copyright holders to refrain from thinking about the ethical dimension of
rights, in particular the impact of the enjoyment of their rights on others.
II. MAINSTREAMING THE IDEA OF RESPONSIBILITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
The preceding Part discussed how and why the copyright system has
caused the irresponsibility mentality problem. This Part considers the way
in which this problem can be addressed. It argues the case for establishing
another major function of copyright law: imposing responsibilities on copy-
right holders and effectively enforcing them. It shows that authors have dual
identities as individuals and as social members. While copyrights are crucial
for each author to achieve self-actualization as an individual, responsibilities
are crucial for shaping each author as a social member.  Section A of this
Part explains how responsibility is encompassed in the law. Sections B, C,
and D explore three ways in which responsibilities shape authors’ social
membership by situating authors in the larger network of (1) sharing cul-
tural resources, (2) shaping cultural power, and (3) promoting social justice.
A. The Idea of Responsibility in Law
The human condition is such that each human being has dual identi-
ties: identities as an individual and as a social member. As an individual,
each human being has unique self-worth and plans for achieving self-actuali-
70 Netanel, supra note 47, at 184.
71 Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d on this point, vacated on other grounds, 489 F.3d 474, 480 n.3
(2d Cir. 2007).
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zation. Meanwhile, each human being is also a social member.72 As a social
member, each human being lives through different groups, organizations,
and communities. Sharing vibrant public spaces is crucial for the human
condition.
Fostering consciousness of one’s rights and one’s endeavors to exercise
these rights allows personal individuality to flourish.73 Likewise, individu-
als’ consciousness of their own respective responsibilities and endeavors to
fulfill those responsibilities are also crucial for human flourishing. This is
because, in contrast to the role of rights in fostering and promoting human
individuality, responsibilities play an indispensible role in shaping each per-
son’s social membership.74
Responsibilities require each person to respond to the consequences
caused by their actions. The attribution of responsibilities first depends on
what a person has done or failed to do (causation).75 If causation is estab-
lished, these responsibilities then generate legal or moral requirements for
that person to meet (liabilities). For example, civil or criminal liabilities
would be attributed to a person whose actions violated a law. Moral liabili-
ties would be attributed to a person whose actions failed to meet moral
requirements. In this way, responsibilities constitute limitations on the ways
in which each person may exercise their individual rights.76  They require
72 As Hannah Arendt reminds us, “men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit
the world.” Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 7 (2d ed. 1998). No
human being lives alone in the world. Rather, human beings live together in a
common world, from birth to death.
73 See Haochen Sun, Designing Journeys to the Social World: Hegel’s Theory of Property
and His Noble Dreams Revisited, 6 Cosmos & Hist.: J. Nat. & Soc. Phil. 33, 44
(2010) (discussing the Hegelian notion that a human being has two inter-related
identities of being — an individual and a social member).
74 See generally Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality 54 (2002)
(“Understanding responsibility, whether in law or morality, is not just a matter of
knowing what it means to say we are responsible, but also of knowing what we are
responsible for and what our prospective responsibilities are.”); Christopher Kutz,
Responsibility, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and the Philoso-
phy of Law 548 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (arguing that the idea of
responsibility plays an important role in operating interpersonal relationships).
75 See Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility 1 (2009) (“Many
of the liability rules [in law] are framed explicitly in terms of someone (usually the
defendant) causing something (usually a harm).”).
76 See, e.g., John Dewey, Responsibility and Freedom, in Ethics 436 (1908), avail-
able at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=2356 (“In
its external aspect, responsibility is liability. An agent is free to act; yes, but—. He
must stand the consequences, the disagreeable as well as the pleasant, the social as
well as the physical.”).
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each person to care not only about their own individual interests, but also
about the impacts of their actions or inactions on other social members.
From this perspective, the idea of responsibility fosters a sense of social
membership among persons and further nurtures the human capabilities to
act as social members. As Peter Cane points out, “[t]he desire to understand
the truth about responsibility grows, one assumes, out of a need or a desire
to discover the meaning of life and what it means to be human.”77
Copyright is an individual right conferred on the creators of copy-
righted works. But why should copyright holders be required to take on
responsibilities?  The following three sections will show that the imposition
of responsibilities on copyright holders stems from the human condition
that individuals are social members. While copyrights protected by law play
a crucial role in fostering a copyright holder’s individuality, responsibilities
imposed by copyright law are indispensable for a copyright holder to nur-
ture his or her social membership. The imposition of responsibilities plays
three roles in nurturing the copyright holder’s social membership. It helps
copyright holders to (1) overcome individualism by responding to others’
contributions to the creation and dissemination of copyrighted works, (2)
perform their role of shaping people’s cultural power properly, and (3) en-
gage in moral deliberation about social justice. This ethical justification for
incorporating responsibilities in copyright law echoes the recent calls from
the academia that “[i]ntellectual property is about social relations and
should serve human values.”78
B. Overcoming Individualism
This section first examines the relationship between individualism and
copyright law through the idea of “romantic authorship.” It then shows
why creating and disseminating a copyrighted work is a socially conditioned
process.  Based on the ethical norm of reciprocity, the section argues that
responsibilities should be imposed on copyright holders as a means of re-
quiring them to respond to others’ contributions to the creation and dissem-
ination of their works.
1. Individualism in Copyright Law
The idea of “romantic authorship” has entrenched strong individual-
ism in copyright law. It asserts that it is the authors’ inner feelings and their
77 Cane, supra note 74, at 283.
78 Sunder, supra note 17, at 331.
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motivations to reveal those feelings to the world that give birth to their
works. Therefore, authors are hailed as the sole creators of their works who
should be given full credit for their contributions. The emphasis on roman-
tic authorship has been widely accepted among many authors. For example,
William Wordsworth states:
For all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: and
though this be true, Poems to which any value can be attached were never
produced on any variety of subjects but by a man who, being possessed of
more than usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply.79
Poems, according to Wordsworth, are composed solely through the fu-
sion of a poet’s emotions and his talent for literary expression. His observa-
tion, therefore, hails the ingenuity that creators inject in their works,
isolating their works from the contributions made by others.80 The individ-
ualistic construction of authorship that Wordsworth championed applies to
many other types of works protected by copyright law.81
As the idea of romantic authorship is “so widespread as to be nearly
universal,”82 it has shaped copyright law as a legal tool functioning prima-
rily to grant and protect individual rights over works of authorship to meet
79 William Wordsworth, Preface to the Second Edition of Several of the Foregoing Poems,
Published, with an Additional Volume, Under the Title of “Lyrical Ballads.”, in The
Poetical Works of Wordsworth 935 (Thomas Hutchinson ed., 1933).
80 Boyle, supra note 68, at 56 (arguing that the romantic vision of authorship per-
petuates the notion that an author is “the genius whose style forever expresses a
single unique persona. . ..”); see also Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1293, 1333–38
(1996); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativ-
ity, 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 293, 293–95 (1992).
81 Rosemary Coombe describes how this individualism-based idea influences the
granting of rights in the law:
[T]he writer is represented in Romantic terms as an autonomous in-
dividual who creates fictions with an imagination free of all constraint. For
such an author, everything in the world must be made available and acces-
sible as an “idea” that can be transformed into his “expression”, which
thus becomes his “work.” Through his labor, he makes these “ideas” his
own; his possession of the “work” is justified by his expressive activity. So
long as the author does not copy another’s expression, he is free to find his
themes, plots, ideas, and characters anywhere he pleases, and to make these
his own (this is also the model of authorship that dominates Anglo-Ameri-
can laws of copyright).
Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Au-
thorship, Appropriation, and the Law 211 (1998).
82 Jack Stillinger, Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius
183 (1991).
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the needs of individualistic impulses of possession and control.83 Rewarding
authors for their creation of new works and protecting their interests are
supposed to be the primary function of copyright law:
A conscientious author, who had a family to maintain, and a prospect of
descendants, would regard the additional labour bestowed upon any con-
siderable work he might have in hand, in the light of an insurance of
money upon his own life for the benefit of his issue . . . . Deny it to him,
and you unfeelingly leave a weight upon his spirits, which must deaden
his exertions; or you force him to turn his faculties . . . to inferior
employments.84
Underlying Wordsworth’s observation is a view of copyright protection as a
response to a variety of purely individualistic needs; copyright law caters to
these needs because the author is assumed to be the sole creator of a work
and therefore deserves strong legal protection. As a result, they have created
“the illusion of certainty”85 in copyright law: the legal definition of an “au-
thor” and a “copyrighted work” is simply determined by the author’s con-
tribution alone. Courts have recognized and enforced the individualistic
impulses expressed by the romantic authorship idea.86 For example, the Su-
preme Court defined “author” as “he to whom anything owes its origin; orig-
inator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.”87
83 Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, Beyond Authorship: Refiguring Rights in
Traditional Culture and Bioknowledge, in Scientific Authorship: Credit and In-
tellectual Property in Science 195, 195 (Mario Biagioli & Peter Galison eds.,
2002), available at http://www.case.edu/affil/sce/authorship-spring2004/article.pdf
(“With its emphasis on originality and self-declaring creative genius, this notion of
authorship has functioned to marginalize or deny the work of many creative people:
women, non-Europeans, artists working in traditional forms and genres, and indi-
viduals engaged in group or collaborative projects, to name but a few.”).
84 William Wordsworth, To the Editor of the Kendal Mercury, inThe Prose Works
of William Wordsworth 309, 312 (W.J.B. Owen & Jane Worthington Smyser eds.,
1974); see also Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, The Law of Texts: Copyright in the
Academy, 57 C. Eng. 769, 771 (1995) (pointing out that “[h]is exalted understand-
ing of an author’s calling leads Wordsworth to advocate an expansive view of copy-
right protection.”).
85 As James Boyle points out, under the romantic vision of authorship,
“[a]uthors tend to win,” because it “provides economic analysis with at least the
illusion of certainty.” Boyle, supra note 68, at 116.
86 Ryan Littrell, Note, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright Law, 43
B.C. L. Rev. 193, 194 (2001) (“[C]ourts approach copyright cases by applying their
intuitive understanding of the author as a creator in the mold of eighteenth and
nineteenth century Romantic authors . . . .”).
87 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884) (empha-
sis added).
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“Writings” of “authors” were the “literary productions” of authors.88 The
Supreme Court in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company further stated
that:
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreduci-
ble, which is one man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless
there is a restriction in the words of the act.89
The Supreme Court reconfirmed in another watershed decision that copy-
rightable works “are original, and founded in the creative powers of the
mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual
labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.”90
2. Others’ Contributions in the Creation and Dissemination of Works
The conception of romantic authorship, however, does not comport
with the reality of how copyrighted works are created and disseminated.91
As this section will show, the life of copyrighted works is socially condi-
tioned. Authors’ individual creative capabilities and efforts are indispensible
for the creation and dissemination of works. But others’ contributions to
authors’ works are crucial as well. Acting as facilitators, others provide cul-
tural artifacts on which an author draw to create new works. Moreover,
others also act as collaborators in disseminating meanings of an author’s
works.
a. Others As Facilitators of Creating Copyrighted Works
The creation of copyrighted works is a socially conditioned process.
Authors must learn from existing cultural artifacts to create new works of
88 Id. at 58.
89 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
90 Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346
(1991).
91 See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
Cal. L. Rev. 1331, 1339 (2004) (“[S]cholars show that the romantic ideal ignores the
actual process of creation, where individuals often work within corporate settings,
an audience collaborates with authors to infuse work with meanings, and authors
draw upon earlier creations.”). See generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright:
The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 Duke L.J. 455, 485–91; Martha Woodman-
see, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 279
(1992).
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authorship. Cultural artifacts include things such as symbols, genres of ex-
pression, and language.92 They are created by different generations of people
and serve as cultural resources from which a human being can draw to con-
nect his own inner cognitive world with the social world of other human
beings and non-human objects.93 They may include non-copyrightable and
copyrightable elements. For example, language is a cultural artifact free for
everyone to use and is not protected by copyright law. On the other hand,
there are cultural artifacts such as novels, poems, musical compositions, and
paintings that may be subject to copyright protection.
Many writers, poets, songwriters, and visual artists have discussed the
steps necessary to integrate existing cultural artifacts into works of author-
ship. First, authors must build the skills required to convey their thoughts
through their works. Nobody is born as an author capable of creating copy-
rightable works.  To become an author, one first needs to learn from copy-
rightable cultural artifacts.94 For example, by reading and appreciating
others’ fiction, one learns how to create characters, plots, settings, themes,
and styles to write fiction. Similarly, by studying and appreciating others’
paintings, one learns how to use colors and lines to paint. Without learning
from others’ works, an author cannot equip himself or herself with the skills
needed to create new works of authorship. The copyrightable cultural arti-
facts needed in this process may be subject to copyright protection or may
remain in the public domain, either because the term of copyright protec-
tion has run out or because the works were created before copyright laws
were enacted.
Second, once having learned the required skills, authors also borrow
from others’ works.95 Literary and artistic borrowings are essential for pro-
92 See Carl Ratner, Historical and Contemporary Significance of Vygotsky’s Sociohistori-
cal Psychology, in Psychology: Theoretical-Historical Perspectives 455, 457
(Robert Rieber & Kurt Salzinger eds., 2d ed. 1998), available at http://www.sonic.
net/~cr2/sociohis.htm (“Cultural artifacts include signs, symbols, linguistic terms,
and humanly produced objects and instruments such as chairs and books.”).
93 Id. (pointing out that cultural artifacts structure human behaviors “by mediat-
ing the person’s relation with the world . . . .”).
94 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1151, 1177–98 (2007) (“Because everyone is a user of artistic and cultural
goods first and a creator second (if at all), an account of creativity constrained by
situatedness must begin with users.”).
95 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 997 (1997) (“Creation does not occur in a vacuum.
Rather, knowledge is cumulative — authors and inventors must necessarily build
on what came before them.”); Cohen, id. at 1183 (“Across the spectrum of creative
practice, manipulation of preexisting texts, objects, and techniques figures centrally
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moting the creativity of works created by the “borrower.” This fact has been
acknowledged and emphasized by many creators of works themselves. For
example, T.S. Eliot states:
One of the surest tests [of the superiority or inferiority of a poet] is the way
in which a poet borrows. Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad
poets deface what they take, and good poets make it into something bet-
ter, or at least something different. The good poet welds his theft into a
whole of feeling which is unique, utterly different than that from which it
is torn; the bad poet throws it into something which has no cohesion. A
good poet will usually borrow from authors remote in time, or alien in
language, or diverse in interest.96
Similarly, Pablo Picasso said that “[g]ood artists copy; great artists
steal.”97 To be sure, Eliot and Picasso are not saying that plagiarism should
be tolerated. They merely assert that even very creative writers or artists
need to borrow from others’ works to create new, original works.98
Third, authors also learn from non-copyrightable cultural artifacts cre-
ated by others to generate inspirations of expression. Non-copyrightable cul-
tural artifacts are very broad in their scope, ranging from language to genres
of expression to social traditions in which authors live. They are not copy-
rightable because they embody the basic media through which human be-
ings perform expressive activities. Many authors have stressed the
importance of this kind of learning experience. For instance, Susan Sontag
admitted, “[i]f literature has engaged me as a project, first as a reader, then
as a writer, it is an extension of my sympathies to other selves, other do-
mains, other dreams, other worlds, other territories.”99 Sontag’s acknowl-
edgment of the roles of others in her work reflects the truism that creators of
works need to draw on cultural artifacts such as language, ideas, culture,
humor, and genre. Works are created in a rich interaction between a creator
and the cultural and social context in which he or she is situated.100
in processes of cultural participation.”); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the
Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1659, 1729 (1988).
96 T.S. Eliot, Philip Massinger, in The Sacred Wood 123, 125 (7th ed. 1972) avail-
able at http://www.bartleby.com/200/sw11.html.
97 Patry, supra note 30, at 73 (emphasis added) (quoting Pablo Piccaso).
98 Id. at 72–74 (summarizing the statements of talented authors to show they
needed to borrow from others’ works to create new works).
99 Geoff Dyer, The diaries of a determined woman, Observer, Jan. 3, 2009, at 19
(quoting Susan Sontag), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/jan/04/
reborn-diaries-susan-sontag-review.
100 See Christian Stallberg, Towards a New Paradigm in Justifying Copyright: An
Universalistic-Transcendental Approach, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent.
L.J. 333, 337 (2008) (“Today it is a common occurrence that intellectual works
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b. Others As Collaborators in Disseminating Copyrighted Works
Authors’ copyrighted works need their audiences to discover, reveal,
and transform their meanings. Rather than acting as passive recipients, audi-
ences of copyrighted works collaborate with authors to disseminate different
layers of the meanings in copyrighted works. It is true that a copyrighted
work would not have been created if its author did not create it the first
place. But any work of authorship has no economic and cultural value unless
its author discloses and circulates the work to an audience that understands
and interprets the meaning of the work.
The collaborator status of the public as the audience of authors’ works
stems from the human condition that speech action can never occur in isola-
tion. As Hannah Arendt pointed out, it is instead “surrounded by and in
constant contact with the web of the acts and words of other men.”101 When
an author makes his work available to the public, it is a speech action in
which he is disseminating information to the public. This speech action
then must be in constant contact with the intended audience. When the
audience reads the work, they are doing more than just reading. Within the
act of reading lies the reader’s response to a given work. Literary theorists
have defined the act of reading as a dialogue between the reader and the
author of a text. The text is given meaning when the two dialogues interact
with each other. Reading allows the reader to link the text to his or her
personal experiences and to interpret the text through this lens:
The special meanings, and more particularly, the submerged associations
that these words and images have for the individual reader will largely
determine what the work communicates to him. The reader brings to the
work personality traits, memories of past events, present needs and preoc-
cupations, a particular mood of the moment, and a particular physical con-
dition. . . . These, and many other elements, interacting with the peculiar
contribution of the work of art, produce a unique experience.102
Authors have concurred with the literary theory that elevates the status
of their audiences to that of collaborators in disseminating the meanings of
their works. Virginia Woolf pointed out that “[the reader] is a far better
judge than the writer. Indeed, given time and liberty to frame his own opin-
never originate exclusively from the person authorship is attributed to. Instead,
every author is integrated into the manifold social and cultural contexts from which
he steadily borrows. Thus, creating intellectual works always means the appropria-
tion of preceding ideas.”).
101 Arendt, supra note 72, at 188.
102 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration 37 (1938).
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ion he is eventually an infallible judge.”103 Marcel Duchamp argues that the
audience of an artistic work ultimately determines the meaning of the work.
According to Duchamp, the creative process continues even after the artist
finishes his work because the art is also made through the admiration its
audience has for it.104 The “artistic execution of the work rest[s] with pure
intuition and cannot be translated into a self-analysis, spoken or written, or
even thought out.”105 Instead, it is the spectator who interprets and com-
pletes the creative process through “inner osmosis.”106 During this process,
“the spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by deci-
phering and interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his contribu-
tion to the creative act.”107
3. Reciprocity-Based Responsibilities Law
As shown above, the creation and dissemination of works is socially
conditioned. This defies the individualism embedded in the conception of
romantic authorship and further raises the question of how authors should
respond to the socially conditioned nature of their creative activities. The
remainder of this section will argue that imposing responsibilities on au-
thors based on the ethical norm of reciprocity would be an important way to
make copyright law responsive to the socially conditioned nature of copy-
righted works.
As an ethical norm, reciprocity teaches that “[w]e ought to be dis-
posed, as a matter of moral obligation, to return good in proportion to the
good we receive, and to make reparation for the harm we have done.”108
Reciprocity promotes social membership by requiring people to take on two
layers of responsibility.109 First, it requires people appreciate positive actions
103 Virginia Woolf et al., The Mrs. Dalloway Reader 12 (2003).
104 See Calvin Tomkins, The Bride & The Bachelors: Five Masters of the
Avant-Garde 9 (1976) (“The artist, Duchamp said, is a ‘mediumistic being’ who does
not really know what he is doing or why he is doing it.”).
105 Marcel Duchamp, The Creative Act, Lecture at the Convention of the Ameri-
can Federation of Arts (Apr. 1957) (transcript available at http://www.wisdompor-
tal.com/Cinema-Machine/Duchamp-CreativeAct.html).
106 Tomkins, supra note 104, at 9.
107 Duchamp, supra note 105.
108 LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 3 (1986).
109 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Ca-
pabilities Approach 72 (2000) (”The core idea of [human nature] is that of the human
being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and
reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the
world in the manner of a ‘flock’ or ‘herd’ animal.”).
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done by others for them.110 People need to be willing to recognize the bene-
fits they have received from others and identify ways in which those benefits
can promote their well-being. Indifference to others’ positive actions will
preclude any possibility of reflecting on the positive consequences of those
actions. Second, reciprocity requires people to act in return for the benefits
they received as a result of others’ actions. Failure to return the favor would
run counter to the ethical norm of reciprocity.
As previously discussed in this Part, human beings live in a social web
of interdependence and cooperation. Reciprocity encourages one social mem-
ber to respond to another’s positive action with their own positive action.
This kindness toward others’ positive deeds requires a person to overcome
selfish impulses and consider how he can reciprocate on the basis of others’
interests. It then increases the predictability and stability of social bonds
among members of the public. As a social norm, it provides predictability to
the original positive actor that the outcome of his kindness will be recipro-
cated. Through this positive reinforcement and repeated practice of recipro-
cal actions, people will become more likely to initiate positive deeds for
others and respond to others’ positive deeds. As positive actions proliferate,
social bonds stabilize.111
Following the norm of reciprocity, copyright law should require au-
thors first to recognize others’ contributions to the creation of their works.
This recognition is of vital importance, as it prompts authors to better un-
derstand the creative process.112  Similarly, it may help judges and legisla-
tors to think about the nature of copyrighted works and make copyright law
in accordance with the social nature of creativity and copyrighted works.113
Moreover, copyright holders’ responsibilities under the reciprocity
norm would further require them to consider what they ought to do in
return for others’ contributions to the creation and dissemination of works.
According to Rawls, “[r]eciprocity is a moral idea situated between imparti-
110 See, e.g., David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice 76 (2006) (“The art
of reciprocity is partly an art of graciously acknowledging favors.”).
111 Id. at 79 (arguing that reciprocity induces cooperation and “enables people to
live together in mutually respectful peace.”).
112 See, e.g., Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, Four Essays 96–97
(1957) (“Poetry can only be made out of other poems; novels out of other novels.
All of this was much clearer before the assimilation of literature to private
enterprise.”).
113 As Justice Story commented, “in literature, in science and in art, there are,
and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and
original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.” Emerson
v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
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ality, which is altruistic, on the one side and mutual advantage on the
other.”114 Copyright holders’ recognition of others’ contributions to their
works is an altruistic move. Yet it is not adequate to achieve mutual advan-
tage since others have not yet benefited from copyright holders. To achieve
mutual advantage, copyright holders need to think about what they should
do to reciprocate others’ contributions to their works.
C. Promoting Copyright Holders’ Role in Shaping Cultural Power
The preceding section showed that, based on the norm of reciprocity,
responsibilities can function to balance the individualism that is emphasized
by the claim of romantic authorship. This section argues that the imposition
of responsibilities upon copyright holders is further necessitated by copy-
right holders’ role in shaping people’s cultural power in social life. This
section first discusses the idea of cultural power and its relationship to copy-
right protection. It then considers the “role responsibility” that should be
imposed on copyright holders.
1. The Idea of Cultural Power
Culture defines who we are and what we can do. In this respect, we are
only passive participants while culture actively shapes our lives. Being
taught how to speak a language, interact with others, and appreciate things
that are dear to us are all testaments to how culture affects the lives of
individuals.115 However, we can simultaneously give internal meaning to
various elements of culture. For example, through fashion, people constantly
challenge acceptable practices and societal norms. Ultimately, people create
new fashion trends that often revolutionize various aspects of our lives.
Cultural power makes it possible for us to be both shaped by culture
and act as the meaning-makers. Two kinds of cultural power — the cultural
114 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 77 (2001).
115 Such a phenomenon has been referred to as “the cultivation of individuals
through the agency of external forms which have been objectified in the court of
history” by sociologist Georg Simmel. Donald N. Levine, Introduction to Georg
Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forms, at ix, xix (Donald N. Levine ed.,
1971); see also J. M. Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology 4–5
(1998) (“Each individual has a unique brain structure that is not merely the product
of genetic inheritance but is shaped and organized in part by her experiences and
activities, especially those in early childhood.”); Barbara Rogoff, The Cultural
Nature Of Human Development 3 (2003) (“Human development is a cultural pro-
cess. As a biological species, humans are defined in terms of our cultural
participation.”).
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power to discuss social issues and the cultural power to critique social issues
— are crucial to individuals and society as a whole. In order to carry on
discussions about social issues, we have to learn how to communicate and we
need at least a slight comprehension of social issues. We cannot discuss re-
ligion or a literary work without any knowledge of such topics. Developing
the enthusiasm to partake in discourse about various social issues, even if our
interests are only peripheral, is another precondition for exercising the cul-
tural power to discuss social issues.
Next is the cultural power to critique. The cultural power to critique
empowers us to think critically about social issues and to depart from tradi-
tions that suppress creativity. A critical attitude toward orthodoxies leads to
enhanced freedom and originality. The cultural power to critique also en-
ables us to reject government propaganda and encourages us to become ac-
tive participants of the policy-making process.
2. The Role of Copyright Holders
Authors participate in the cultural life of society by externalizing their
thoughts and feelings through their works. They publish their works, mak-
ing them available to the public. Their works contain discussions and reflec-
tions about issues relating to various aspects of social life. From this
perspective, their works are crucial for members of the public to develop
their cultural power.
First, works protected by copyright law play an important role in shap-
ing people’s cultural power to discuss social issues. Textbooks are essential
for students at different levels of studies, equipping them with the necessary
language skills and knowledge about various aspects of human life and soci-
ety. Moreover, literary, musical, and artistic works such as novels, poems,
songs, films, paintings, and sculptures are the necessary sources through
which people in all walks of life achieve constant re-education by them-
selves. They help people learn about the cultural and political development
of their society. Only after acquiring such knowledge can people enable
themselves to participate in the discussion of social issues.116 The availability
of works also improves people’s willingness to discuss social issues. Copy-
righted materials circulated by traditional media such as newspapers,
116 See Cohen, supra 94, at 1171 (“Both copyright scholars and cultural theorists
understand cultural texts (including both conventional literary texts and all other
forms of artistic expression) as performing a cultural transmission function.”); Lit-
man, supra note 18, at 16 (“Reading, listening, and viewing have never been acts of
purely passive absorption; they have always entailed meaningful creativity and im-
agination.”); .
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magazines, and TV stations frequently reveal and examine new social issues
and ignite public debate. Copyrighted materials circulated by new media
such as blogs, Twitter, video-sharing sites, and online encyclopedias have
created new means of engaging people to discuss social issues.117
Second, works protected by copyright law are also important for people
to develop their cultural power to critique social issues. A wealth of literary,
musical, and artistic works convey authors’ moral reflections on the causes of
massive catastrophes such as wars, famines, environmental pollution, or
small-scale issues concerning how an individual can get along with his fam-
ily, friends, or strangers. These works prompt their audiences to think about
moral issues for their individual lives as well as society as a whole. From this
perspective, copyrighted works promote humanitarian evolution by spread-
ing ideas that expand the sphere of people’s moral concerns about interper-
sonal relationships and the larger structure of human society.118 They not
only impart knowledge to people to critique a wide range of social issues,
but also encourage people to develop and express views that are critical of
orthodoxies. Mario Vargas Llosa, a Nobel Laureate in Literature, wrote that
“[n]othing awakens the critical spirit in a society as much as good litera-
ture.”119 According to Llosa, good literature can play such an important role
because, “by awakening the critical spirit, [it] creates citizens who are more
difficult to manipulate than in a society without literature and without good
books.“120
The role of authors in shaping people’s cultural power creates a new
lens through which we can re-envision the nature of copyrighted works.
Roland Barthes reminds us as follows:
117 Litman, supra note 14, at 16 (“The widespread deployment of digital tech-
nology now allows readers, listeners, and viewers to express their creative readings
in fixed form and share them with the world.”); see generally Philip M. Napoli,
Audience Evolution: New Technologies and the Transformation of Media
Audiences (2011).
118 Peter Singer, Is Violence History?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2011, at BR1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/books/review/the-better-angels-of-our-na-
ture-by-steven-pinker-book-review.html?ref=books (“[T]he invention of printing,
and the development of a cosmopolitan ‘Republic of Letters’ in the 17th and 18th
centuries helped to spread ideas that led to the humanitarian revolution. That was
pushed further in the 19th century by popular novels like ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin’ and
‘Oliver Twist’ that, by encouraging readers to put themselves in the position of
someone very different from themselves, expanded the sphere of our moral
concern.”).
119 Luis Torres de la Llosa, Nobel laureate worries for literature in digital age, ABS-
CBN News (Oct. 8, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/lifestyle/10/08/
10/nobel-laureate-worries-literature-digital-age.
120 Id.
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[A] text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and en-
tering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is
one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader,
not, as was hitherto said, the author. The reader is the space on which all
the quotations that make up a writing as inscribed without any of them
being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination.121
Barthes’s observation shows that the value of copyrighted works does
not lie only in the degree to which authors’ interests are protected. Their
value should also be measured in terms of the ways in which they shape
people’s cultural power to discuss and critique social issues. This is because
publicly available cultural resources are essential for the creation of copy-
righted works, and such works are in turn essential for people to develop
their cultural power. The dynamic public dimension of copyrighted works
thus requires copyright law not to treat the value of works solely in terms of
their copyright holders’ interests. Rather, the law should highlight the pub-
lic interest dimensions of copyright protection in fostering and promoting
people’s cultural power.
3. The Role Responsibility of Copyright Holders
The idea of role responsibilities, according to H. L. A. Hart, is crucial
in shaping a “responsible person” who behaves properly. Hart justifies role
responsibility in the following way:
A sea captain is responsible for the safety of his ship, and that is his re-
sponsibility, or one of his responsibilities. A husband is responsible for the
maintenance of his wife; parents for the upbringing of their children . . . a
clerk for keeping the accounts of his firm. These examples of a person’s
responsibilities suggest the generalization that, whenever a person occu-
pies a distinctive place or office in a social organization, to which specific
duties are attached to provide for the welfare of others or to advance in
some specific way the aims or purposes of the organization, he is properly
said to be responsible for the performance of these duties, or for doing
what is necessary to fulfill them. Such duties are a person’s
responsibilities.122
Responsibility, as Hart shows, could be imposed on a person based on
the role he or she plays in a social setting. A person occupies a specific
position such as a sea captain, a husband, or a clerk. This socially identifiable
121 Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in Image-Music-Text (Stephen
Heath ed., trans., 8th ed. 1968).
122 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy
of Law 212 (2d ed. 2008).
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position triggers corresponding responsibilities to benefit others who have
relationships with the person in that role. If a person fails to fulfill the
responsibility in proportion to his or her role, he or she would be held le-
gally or morally accountable. Role responsibility, therefore, induces persons
to think seriously about the specific roles they ought to occupy as social
members and how to fulfill the corresponding responsibilities to play their
roles well. Hart emphasizes this reflexive function of role responsibility. For
example, he points out that “[a] responsible person is one who is disposed to
take his duties seriously; to think about them, and to make serious efforts to
fulfill them. To behave responsibly is to behave as a man would who took
his duties in this serious way.”123
Therefore, authors’ roles as social members participating in social life
open up a new ethical dimension of copyright law. Individual rights over
copyrighted works are designed to promote and protect authors’ roles as
individual proprietors. Individual rights have limited power in shaping au-
thors’ participation in social life.124 The imposition of role responsibilities
upon authors can make copyright law function to shape the ways in which
authors carry out their roles as social members. Authors’ role responsibilities
should center on the ways in which authors, by disseminating works that
empower others to discuss and critique social issues, can help these members
of the public to nurture and enhance their own cultural power in social life.
In addition, copyright affects the ways in which cultural power is allocated
among people. By conferring upon copyright holders the right to exclude
others from using intangible assets under their proprietary control, copy-
right law affects how cultural exchanges and interactions among people oc-
cur, and whether or not they enhance their cultural power.
D. Inducing Moral Deliberation about Social Justice
This section argues that the need to induce moral deliberation about
social justice among copyright holders further necessitates the imposition of
responsibilities upon them. It shows that, as social members, copyright
123 Id. at 213.
124 Professor Carol Rose emphasized that a successful property system should
have the educative function of guiding citizens to behave responsibly: “[P]roperty
regimes . . . induce the very qualities of cooperation, attentiveness to others, respon-
sibility, and self-restraint that themselves are the prerequisites to the successful han-
dling and trade of property. . . . All this suggests . . . property as a keystone right,
that is, as an educative institution.” Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?,
71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 329, 364 (1996).
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holders can promote social justice by taking on the responsibilities that are
relevant to their copyrighted works.
1. The Tension Between Copyright Protection and Social Justice
It is widely recognized that all human beings are equal individuals
with equal worth.125  Yet, disparities exist in all modern societies.  For ex-
ample, income inequality exists in many societies and continues to
worsen.126 Against this backdrop, social justice has been championed as a
human value to minimize the impact unequal distribution of resources has
on the disadvantaged. The following statement by John Rawls captures the
essence of social justice as a fundamental human value:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of
thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or
revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how effi-
cient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are
unjust.127
Hailed as a fundamental human value, social justice measures the de-
gree of inequality a society accommodates through its institutions. It there-
fore defines the characters of a society in which people live.  In general, it
requires individuals and governments to make sustained efforts to combat
inequalities.128 At the individual level, social justice requires that the ad-
vantaged be subject to appropriate redistributive mandates, diverting their
resources to take care of the disadvantaged. At the social level, it requires
125 For example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights states
that, “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit
of brotherhood.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
126 See Ilyana Kuziemko and Stefanie Stantcheva, Our Feelings About Inequality:
It’s Complicated, available at opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/our-feel-
ings-about-inequality-its-complicated/?ref=opinion (“Since the 1970s, income ine-
quality in the United States has increased at a historic rate. In 1970, the richest 1
percent of Americans enjoyed 9 percent of total national pre-tax income. In 2011,
by contrast, that share had risen to 19.8 percent.”).
127 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 3 (rev. ed. 1999).
128 According to the Rawlsian Difference Principle, “the higher expectations of
those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which
improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society.” Id. at 65.
Rawls further explained that “[t]he intuitive idea is that the social order is not to
establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so
is to the advantage of these less fortunate.” Id.
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that the government take affirmative measures to nurture a just society. To
this end, the government may redistribute resources owned by the ad-
vantaged to meet the needs of the disadvantaged.
Does copyright protection cause social inequality? If so, is there a gen-
eral basis for imposing further responsibilities copyright holders the purpose
of promoting social justice? This section answers each question in the af-
firmative. For example, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”)129
enacted by Congress in 1994, carries distributive consequences that have
disadvantaged certain groups of content users. Section 514 of the URAA,
codified in 17 U.S.C. § 104A and effective January 1, 1996, automatically
restored copyright protection to certain foreign works in the public domain.
Effective January 1, 1996, Section 514 automatically restored copyright pro-
tection to all works of foreign origin that were not yet in the public domain
in their source countries, but that were in the public domain in the United
States for specified reasons.130
17 U.S.C. § 104A has caused social inequality in two ways. First, hold-
ers of copyrights over restored works can charge fees for works that consum-
ers had previously used for free. Take orchestra groups as an example.
Orchestras have two ways of performing a work in the public domain —
they can purchase the necessary sheet music or they can rent physical copies
of the sheet music.131 There is only one option for performing a work under
copyright protection — renting the sheet music.132 “Rental fees for a full
orchestration of a copyrighted work can be $800 or more for a single per-
formance.”133 The cost will only go up for an orchestral group that requires
a longer rehearsal period.134 Such rental fees can get extremely expensive for
small orchestras.135 Since the passage of 17 U.S.C. § 104A, the price of a
129 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514,
108 Stat. 4809, 4976 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006)).
130 Foreign authors had no recourse for the lack of protection in years prior to
§ 104A’s enactment. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1) (2006). They therefore enjoyed fewer
total years of exclusivity than did their U.S. counterparts. Foreign works lacked
protection in the United State for any of three reasons: (1) The United State did not
protect works from the country of origin at the time of publication; (2) The United
State did not protect sound recordings fixed before 1972; and (3) The United States
did not protect works of an author who had failed to comply with U.S. statutory
formalities. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C) (2006).
131 Brief of the Conductors Guild & the Music Library Ass’n as Amici Curiae




135 Id. at 5.
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score of Shostakovich’s Preludes and Fugues Op. 87 has risen by a multiple of
seven.136 Peter and the Wolf, a popular orchestral piece for young children, can
no longer publicly be performed without permission from the copyright
holder.137 In this context, Justice Breyer criticized the passage of 17 U.S.C.
§ 104A. “If a school orchestra or other nonprofit organization cannot afford
the new charges . . . [t]hey will have to do without.”138 That, however,
would “aggravat[e] the already serious problem of cultural education in the
United States.”139
Second, 17 U.S.C. § 104A places on the general public a heavy burden
of locating copyright holders of restored works to negotiate a license or a fee
for using them. Orphan works are “works that appear to be ‘in-copyright’
but whose authors cannot be identified or located.”140 17 U.S.C. § 104A
will exacerbate the orphan works problem.141 To license a copyrighted work,
one must know the date and country of publication or creation and deter-
mine whether the work was under copyright protection in the country of
origin at the date of restoration.142 Yet, finding the right holder after a work
is restored from the public domain can be extraordinarily difficult, or impos-
sible.143 This is especially problematic for many libraries. The restoration
“affects potentially millions of works formerly in the public domain, many
of which could be made available at the Internet Archive, on Wikimedia
sites, in the HathiTrust Digital Library, or via myriad other libraries and
digital repositories,” in the nation.144 “In order to acquire and provide ac-
cess to digital materials, libraries and digital repositories are dependent on
reliable conclusions as to whether a work is in the public domain.”145 The
restoration will “force[ ] them to operate in a gray area, subject to real liti-
gation concerns and subsequent chilling effects.”146 As a result, “libraries
will simply not reproduce the material or make it available online until they
136 Id. at 11.
137 Id. at 11.
138 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 905 (2012) (No. 10-545) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
139 Id.
140 Brief Amici Curiae of Am. Library Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioners at 19,




144 Id. at 16.
145 Id. at 17.
146 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLS\4-2\HLS201.txt unknown Seq: 37 11-SEP-13 8:59
2013 / Copyright and Responsibility 299
can be sure the copyright has expired - which may mean waiting for over a
century.”147
2. Copyright Owners’ Responsibilities for Promoting Social Justice
The above discussion showed the tension between copyright protection
and the promotion of social justice in our society. One way of addressing the
tension is to require copyright holders to undertake responsibilities to ease
the burden that copyright protection places on the affected public. Central
to social justice is how to allocate division of responsibilities in society. For
instance, John Rawls states:
This conception [of justice] includes what we may call a social division of
responsibility: society, the citizens as a collective body, accepts the responsi-
bility for maintaining the equal basic liberties and fair equality of oppor-
tunity, and for providing a fair share of the other primary goods for
everyone within this framework, while citizens (as individuals) and associa-
tions accept the responsibility for revising and adjusting their ends and
aspirations in view of the all-purpose means they can expect, given their
present and foreseeable situation.148
From the perspective of distributing responsibilities, social justice dic-
tates that the benefits and burdens of social cooperation must be appropri-
ately distributed among citizens. Rawls further states, “the principles of
social justice . . . provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic
institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the
benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”149
Within a system of social cooperation, copyright holders should be re-
quired to bear burdens in proportion to the benefits they receive from copy-
right protection. Ex post, copyright holders’ burdens, or responsibilities,
would require them to take action to mitigate social inequalities resulting
from copyright protection. Ex ante, these responsibilities would require
them to think about and respond to the ways in which copyright protection
affects the distribution of social resources. Copyright holders should ponder
the legitimacy of any initiative to strengthen the legal protection of copy-
rights from the perspective of social justice, in particular whether a socially
beneficial distribution of benefits and burdens is achievable.
147 Id.
148 John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in Collected Papers 359, 371
(Samuel Freeman ed., Harvard University Press, 1999).
149 Rawls, supra note 127, at 4.
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E. Summary
This Part showed that a copyrighted work is not only the embodiment
of its author’s thought and personality. Instead, these works are a social
enterprise that arises from shared cultural resources, shapes cultural power,
and promotes social justice. The social privilege inherent in all copyrighted
works provides the ethical justification for introducing responsibility into
copyright and enforcing it as another core function of copyright law. Follow-
ing the ethics of responsibility, copyright law should function both to grant
exclusive rights to copyright holders and to impose social responsibilities on
them.
III. ENFORCING RESPONSIBILITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Many ethical norms take effect only when they are translated into legal
rules that create penalties for violations of their ethical mandates. The same
should apply to the ethics of responsibility for copyright holders as discussed
in the preceding Part. The Part that follows examines the extent to which
the ethics of responsibility can be translated into legal rules in copyright
law. It argues that this transition should involve two crucial steps of imple-
mentation. The first step deals with the assimilation of what I call the re-
sponsibility policy into copyright law. The second step involves applying
the responsibility policy and the redefinition of the nature of copyright limi-
tations in order to reform copyright law. The reform should introduce legal
rules to enforce two kinds of copyright holders’ responsibilities: negative
responsibilities and collective responsibilities.
A. The Place of the Responsibility Policy in Copyright Law
1. The Limits of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment
It is widely accepted that the Copyright Clause and the First Amend-
ment lay the policy foundation for copyright law. The central policy embed-
ded in the Copyright Clause is the mandate that copyright statutes should
promote “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”150 However, such stat-
utes cannot contravene the First Amendment. Thus, the limited term of
copyright protection, the idea/expression dichotomy, and the fair use doc-
150 The Copyright Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
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trine have been recognized as essential safeguards to make copyright law
compatible with freedom of expression.151
However, both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment have
limitations as the policy bases of copyright protection. First of all, both of
them only address state action, setting up a check on the governmental power
to regulate informational resources.152 According to the state action doc-
trine, neither the Copyright Clause nor the First Amendment can directly
apply to private action taken by the copyright holder to affect the public’s
access to and use of copyrighted materials.153  Thus, since the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment are not directly enforceable against copy-
right holders, they do not provide a legal basis to penalize the wrongdoings
resulting from their irresponsible acts discussed in Part I.
Moreover, neither the Copyright Clause nor the First Amendment have
acted as an effective check on the government in allocating proprietary con-
trol over informational resources through copyright regulation.154 For in-
stance, the Supreme Court has stated that the Copyright Clause does not
empower the judiciary to scrutinize whether a state action to expand copy-
right protection is valid under the Clause. “[The Court is] not at liberty to
second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this or-
151 E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985) (emphasizing “the First Amendment protections already embodied in the
Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded
by fair use. . ..”).
152 For example, as the Supreme Court held in Wooley v. Maynard, “the right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” 430
U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
153 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (“Careful adher-
ence to the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by
limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power.”); see also Wilson R.
Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1379, 1388 (2006) (“[T]he Constitution does not purport to determine how one
person is to treat another. So far as the Constitution is concerned, one individual may
steal the possessions of another, assault another person, even commit murder, and it
is not a violation of the Constitution.”).
154 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 47 (proposing that copyright law should be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solici-
tude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2187, 2239 (2000)
(“The point remains the same: in an age of increasing ‘statutorification’ in intellec-
tual property law, the system needs a counterweight where the legislative process is
skewed. The [Copyright] Clause of the constitution, long dormant, seems the best
candidate.”).
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der, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”155 Without any
institutional check on the state power to allocate informational resources,
the Copyright Clause has instead become the ground on which the legisla-
ture can strengthen copyright protection,156 which chiefly caters to the pri-
vate interest of copyright holders and brings about marginal or no benefits
for the public interest in regards to learning and knowledge sharing.
Furthermore, both the rights to free speech157 and to property158 are
considered fundamental to citizens. This equal doctrinal status renders it
impossible for the right to free speech to gain primacy over a property right,
such as copyright.159 Thus, in allocating informational resources through
copyright law, the government may not presumptively give primacy to free
155 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003). The Court also concluded, “it
is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright
Clause’s objectives.” Id. at 212; see also Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[I]t is
Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of [rights] that
should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate
access to their work product.”).
156 See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 Geo. L.J. 1771,
1837 (2006) (“[E]ven if an Eldred II were filed tomorrow, we would still be unlikely
to see the Supreme Court writing a manifesto about the nature of the [Copyright]
Clause as a limitation [on government’s power in allocation of information
resources].”).
157 Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“The right of free speech, the right to teach, and the right of assembly are, of
course, fundamental rights.”).
158 See Rose, supra note 124, at 330, 349; see also Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and
Constitutionalism, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 907, 908 (1993) (“[P]roperty should be seen
as a political right, one that reduces dependence on the state and creates the kind of
security that is indispensable to genuine citizenship in a democracy.”). But cf. Laura
S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1033
(1996).
159 The conflicting judicial opinions regarding shopping mall cases demonstrate
this point. In some cases, courts ruled against private owners of shopping malls and
ordered the opening of malls for free speech activities. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B.
Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760–61 (N.J. 1994). Yet, courts also have ruled to the
contrary on the basis that “property [does not] lose its private character merely
because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.” Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 705 (1977); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521–23 (1976); Stranahan v.
Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 P.3d 228, 244 (Or. 2000); W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982
Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1339 (Pa. 1986).
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speech values over the need to protect copyrights.160 Moreover, courts have
ruled that copyright can actually trump the free speech right in certain
cases. For example, in treating copyrighted works as the embodiment of
their creators’ speeches, the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft held that the
free speech value “bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make
[copyright holders’] speeches.”161 This is because “although a message con-
stitutes speech when the original speaker expresses it, it does not constitute
speech when the copyist copies it.”162
2. Mainstreaming the Responsibility Policy into Copyright Law
a. The Role of the Responsibility Policy
The responsibility policy would function to fill in the gap left by the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. By infusing copyright holders’
rights with responsibilities, copyright law would treat responsibilities as the
quid pro quo for granting a bundle of exclusive rights to copyright owners.
The responsibility policy would thereby provide a new policy consideration
to help stakeholders of copyright protection (legislators, judges, copyright
administrators, and copyright activists) rethink the function of copyright
law. Copyright law would then function to ensure that creators with copy-
right protection would contribute to the public interest by improving the
accumulation and dissemination of information and enhancing creativity
and innovation in the economic and cultural development of society.
To carry out the responsibility policy, legislators and regulators should
actively examine the extent to which responsibilities should be imposed on
copyright holders. The past expansions of copyright protection, according to
many commentators, were made primarily to benefit copyright holders’ in-
terests.163 These statutory expansions of copyright protection have facilitated
160 See David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy,
65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 281, 295–96 (2004).
161 537 U.S. at 221.
162 Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 Hastings
L.J. 1083, 1116 (2010).
163 Litman, supra note 14, at 7 (“[In the past,] copyright lobbyists engaged in
protracted negotiations with one another to arrive at copyright laws that enriched
established copyright industries at the expense of both creators and the general pub-
lic. There’s ample reason to anticipate that the next copyright revision will proceed
in similar fashion to similar ends.”); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the
Digital Economy: Why the Anti- Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 523 (1999) (“[B]y colorful use of high rhetoric and
forceful lobbying, Hollywood and its allies were successful in persuading Congress
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the convenience with which copyright holders can exploit their works or
strengthen the exclusive rights bestowed on them. They have also imposed a
greater burden on the public in their use of copyrighted works.
The orphan works problem demonstrates one way in which the failure
to recognize a responsibility policy has negatively impacted copyright law.
The problem refers to “the situation where the owner of a copyrighted work
cannot be identified and located by someone who wishes to make use of the
work in a manner that requires permission of the copyright owner.”164 The
British Library “estimates that over 40 percent of all in-copyright works are
[o]rphan [w]orks.”165 To address this problem, the U.S. Copyright Office
offered a proposal to legislatively restrict the remedies that copyright hold-
ers can seek if users are unable to locate the holder after first engaging in a
“reasonably diligent search.”166 Yet, the proposal fails to consider the re-
sponsibilities that should be imposed on copyright holders to directly facili-
tate the resolution of this problem. After all, it is the copyright holder who
has “abandoned” their works in the marketplace and has made it difficult
for the user to locate him or her.
Because the copyright holderss abandonment causes the orphan works
problem, one must consider whether such right holders have any responsi-
bility to take part in problem-solving initiatives. The scrutiny over copy-
right holders’ responsibilities is particularly important when legislators
to adopt the broad anti-circumvention legislation they favored, even if it is now
subject to some specific exceptions that respond to some concerns raised by Silicon
Valley firms and their allies in the legislative process.”).
164 Marybeth Peters, U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works 1
(2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf; see also
Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005) (defining orphan works as
those “whose owners are difficult or even impossible to locate”); see also Bernard
Lang, Orphan Works and the Google Book Search Settlement: An International Perspective,
55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 111, 116 (2010–11) (“A work is said to be orphan when its
rights holder cannot be identified or found, even after a diligent search, so that it is
not possible to obtain a license for exploiting protected uses of the work.”); Samuel-
son, supra note 7, at 483 (identifying orphan books as “books whose rights holders
cannot readily be located. . ..”).
165 Orphan Works and Mass Digitisation, British Library, http://pressandpolicy.
bl.uk/ImageLibrary/detail.aspx?MediaDetailsID=635 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
166 Marybeth Peters, U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works 96
(2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf. For a
detailed analysis of this proposal, see Denise Troll Covey, Rights, Registries, and Reme-
dies: An Analysis of Responses to the Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry Regarding Orphan
Works, in Free Culture and the Digital Library Symposium Proceedings
2005 106 (Martin Halbert ed., 2005), available at http://works.bepress.com/denise_
troll_covey/45.
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consider proposals to enact or amend law to expand copyright protection or
regulators make proposals to resolve copyright problems. Legislators and
regulators should consider concrete policy implications of the three ethical
justifications for copyright holders’ responsibilities. They should examine
how copyright holders should contribute to the creation and dissemination
of their works. They should also pay sufficient attention to how any en-
hancement of copyright holders’ rights would affect their role in shaping
people’s use of cultural power. Furthermore, they should scrutinize the ex-
tent to which any expansion of copyright protection would cause users nega-
tive distributive consequences, especially to those who use copyrighted
materials for the purpose of teaching, news reporting, and research.
To ensure the effectiveness of the responsibility policy, legislators and
regulators should require copyright lobbyists to analyze the relationship be-
tween copyright holders’ responsibilities and their proposals to expand copy-
right protection. Copyright lobbyists would need to show that any
expansions of copyright protection would be commensurate with the respon-
sibilities that copyright holders owe to the public. After receiving briefings
from lobbyists, legislators and regulators can then examine the relationship
between copyright holders’ responsibilities and any proposals to beef up cop-
yright protection.  If they find the relationship to be negative, then they
should demand that lobbyists propose solutions to ensure that copyright
holders would have adequate responsibilities.
Treating the responsibility policy as a new copyright policy would not
mean displacing the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment as the pol-
icy basis for copyright law. Instead, the responsibility policy would fill in
the gap left by the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment and buttress
their policy mandates. First, the idea of responsibility would require the
stakeholders of copyright protection to look beyond state actors to consider
the impact of copyright holders on the protection of public interests. As
discussed earlier, non-state actors such as copyright conglomerates have
played a dominant role in shaping copyright law.167 However, as shown
above, the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment do not apply to non-
state actors such as copyright holders.  By contrast, the responsibility policy
directly applies to copyright holders by requiring them to exercise their
rights in responsible ways, with penalties for irresponsible acts. Moreover, it
also requires state actors to make sure that copyright law is enacted and
enforced with adequate measures to prevent copyright owners’ irresponsible
167 Merges, supra note 154, at 2236 (pointing out that the CTEA “was the Walt
Disney Company’s ‘highest priority’ in the 1998 legislative session of Congress.”).
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actions. Therefore, the responsibility policy targets both private actors (cop-
yright holders) and state actors.
Second, the responsibilities imposed upon copyright owners would be
concrete measures by which to facilitate Copyright Clause and First Amend-
ment policy mandates, such as the promotion of “the Progress of Science
and useful Arts”168 and freedom of expression, respectively. Such responsi-
bilities would require certain actions of copyright holders in order to realize
those policy goals. For that purpose, the responsibility policy would require
legislators and judges to think about why certain responsibilities should be
imposed upon copyright holders, and further how those responsibilities
ought to be enforced by copyright law.
Third, the responsibility policy would direct legislators and judges to
make decisions that are faithful to the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment. As copyright holders would be required to act in responsible
ways, their aggressive lobbying to strengthen copyright protection solely for
their own interests would violate the ethics of responsibility. State actors
who make legislative or administrative decisions that are skewed by those
lobbying activities would violate the ethics of responsibility as well. There-
fore, the responsibility policy would act as an ethical buttress to the Copy-
right Clause and the First Amendment, making them have stronger
mandates for requiring socially desirable copyright legislation and
regulation.
b. Copyright Limitations as Copyright Holders’ Responsibilities
How should copyright law accommodate and enforce responsibility as a
copyright policy? This section argues that copyright law can accomplish this
goal by treating copyright limitations as the responsibilities imposed upon
copyright holders. Such limitations already codified in copyright law in-
clude the fair use exception and the compulsory license scheme. Taking re-
sponsibility, as shown in the first section of Part II, means that parties
cannot exercise their rights without due regard for the potential conse-
quences to others.
In treating copyright limitations as responsibilities, they would no
longer be treated as affirmative defenses to copyright infringement claims.169
Take fair use as an example. In a copyright dispute, a copyright holder (the
plaintiff) first establishes a prima facie case for copyright infringement. A
user (the defendant) can then invoke fair use as an affirmative defense. The
168 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
169 Sun, supra note 13, at 134–42.
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user has the burden to prove that his use of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work
can constitute a fair use under Section 107 of the Copyright Act.170 How-
ever, treating fair use as an affirmative defense, as one of my earlier articles
demonstrated, has “caused direct and indirect harms to public interests in
free speech, democratic participation, and cultural development.”171
Treating fair use as an affirmative defense is problematic because it
only considers whether copyright holders’ rights are infringed or not. If a
user cannot prove the existence of fair use, he would be held liable for copy-
right infringement. This does not require judges to consider copyright hold-
ers’ responsibilities or use them as the baseline policy factors.
Instead, the fair use analysis should be grounded in the premise that
copyright holders must be required to take responsibilities to accommodate
fair uses. It would transform a fair use case into a judicial inquiry about
whether the copyright holder has taken the responsibility to accommodate
fair uses. When a user-defendant invokes the fair use doctrine to negate the
infringement claim raised by a plaintiff-copyright holder, the judge should
require the copyright holder to bear the burden of proving that there is no
fair use and therefore no need for accommodation.
Procedurally, the copyright holder should bear two burdens of proof.
He first needs to prove that the user made unauthorized use of his work to
establish the prima facie case of copyright infringement. He then needs to
prove that the unauthorized use does not constitute fair use, if the user
moves to rely on the fair use doctrine to negate his claim of copyright
infringement.
Apart from the procedural function to shift the burden of proof, treat-
ing fair use as a responsibility imposed on copyright holders would require
judges to examine the actions that copyright holders should take to accom-
modate fair uses. In particular, this responsibility-based fair use approach
would be helpful for judges to decide difficult cases concerning fair use of
copyrighted works, such as the Google Books Library Project case. Google
was sued for copyright infringement after copying verbatim copyrighted
works without authorization. It was very difficult for the court to decide
whether or not the Google Book Library Project constitutes a fair use. This
is because the court faced the exceedingly complex questions of  whether
Google’s online indexing of books is a transformative use of works172 and the
170 E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (ruling
that “[s]ince fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent would have . . . the
burden of demonstrating fair use. . ..”).
171 Sun, supra note 13, at 152.
172 See Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55.
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 19, 27-31 (2010).
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project may affect copyright holders’ marketing of similar digital library
services.173 To resolve such questions, the court must examine whether copy-
right holders have any specific responsibilities to accommodate fair use. The
identification of copyright holders’ responsibilities, as the following discus-
sion will show, is a judicial process to specify the public interests involved in
fair use cases.
The court may first maintain that copyright holders have the responsi-
bility to accommodate the public’s collective right to cultural participation
and to benefit from technological advances. Through the technology ad-
vanced by Google, the public can obtain “basic bibliographic information”
about the works and use the “search term” to locate relevant contents.174
These are informational resources located in the public domain and not sub-
ject to copyright protection. Having access to and use of them are of essen-
tial importance for the public to enjoy its rights. For example, the Project
aids cultural participation by helping researchers and teachers locate the in-
formation they need. Although, verbatim copying by Google is necessary to
help the public enjoy these rights in a meaningful way, the court should also
note that Google has taken measures in order to prevent or minimize the
potential harm to the copyright holders. For example, it only shows snippets
of the works to the public, displays copyright notices, and links the public
to the pages from which they can purchase the works.
Second, the court may further maintain that copyright holders have the
responsibility to accommodate the public in exercising their collective right
to protection of our cultural ecosystem. Digital technology opens a myriad
of opportunities to archive works by digitizing them. It facilitates and en-
hances our cultural ecosystem by reducing the cost for the public to use
works and enriching the diversity of works available to the public.175 From
this perspective, copyright holders must participate in the digital technol-
ogy-based protection of our cultural ecosystem by allowing digital archiving
that is being carried out by the agent, such as Google.  Since Google is a for-
profit organization, the court may require it either to donate a reasonable
portion of its Project revenues to non-for-profit public interest organiza-
tions, or to reasonably compensate copyright holders for their involvement
in the project.
Yet it does not necessarily follow that courts should invoke the respon-
sibility policy in every case that examines whether copyright holders should
173 See Sag, id. at 33-36.
174 Google Books Library Project, Google, www.google.com/googlebooks/li-
brary.html.
175 See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 993–97.
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accommodate the public interest. This mode of adjudication may render
many conventional copyright doctrines dysfunctional in dealing with private
law suits. Instead, courts should use the responsibility policy analysis as a
last resort. Only when courts find it difficult to make a decision after using
conventional doctrinal tools should they use the responsibility policy analy-
sis. In this context, courts can draw on the responsibility policy analysis to
consider whether, and to what extent, the copyright holder has social re-
sponsibilities to the public.
B. Promoting the Ethics of Responsibilities among Copyright Holders
The preceding section discussed ways in which copyright law can help
the three branches of the government enforce responsibilities upon copy-
right holders. Adopting the responsibility policy would broaden the spec-
trum of policy considerations that legislators and regulators must make.
Defining copyright limitations as copyright holders’ responsibilities would
also help judges make socially sound decisions that accommodate diverse
public interests in the production and dissemination of copyrighted works.
The responsibility policy is designed to guide public institutions,
namely the three branches of the government, in protecting copyrights. The
two conceptions of responsibility discussed in the following two sections
play a different role. Negative responsibilities and collective responsibilities
are designed to guide private parties, namely copyright holders, with the
ethical conduct code. Section 1 canvasses the legal rules that can enforce
copyright holders’ negative responsibilities, help overcome individualism in
copyright protection, and facilitate copyright holders’ role in shaping users’
cultural power. Section 2 discusses the issues that must be addressed before
actually enforcing copyright holders’ collective responsibilities concerning the
promotion of social justice.
1. Negative Responsibilities
Copyright holders’ responsibilities take two forms: negative and posi-
tive. Negative responsibilities limit copyright holders to exercising their
rights in ways that do not harm users’ legitimate interests in making use of
copyrighted works.176 By contrast, positive responsibilities require copyright
176 For the idea of negative responsibility, see Thomas W. Pogge, World Pov-
erty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms 131
(2002); H. M. Malm, Directions of Justification in the Negative-Positive Duty Debate, 27
Am. Phil. Q. 315, 315 (1990) (“Let us refer to duties not to cause harm as negative duties,
and to duties to prevent harm as positive duties.”).
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holders to take affirmative actions to promote and protect users’ legitimate
interests.177 Because such affirmative actions may impose too heavy a burden
on copyright holders, I propose that negative responsibilities are a more
viable solution.
a. The Basis of Negative Responsibilities
Negative responsibilities apply to two types of uses of copyrighted
works by the public. The first type of use causes no harm to copyright hold-
ers, while the second type causes them minor harm. In the former situation,
negative responsibilities should require copyright holders to accommodate
such harmless unauthorized uses.178
A wide range of private uses cause no harm to copyright holders: a
person emails an academic article to his colleague, makes a copy of a film
and sends it to his family to ask for their comments, or records a TV pro-
gram to watch at a later time. In all of these cases, no harm is caused to
copyright holders. Moreover, a wide range of uses of copyrighted works in
the public setting theoretically do not cause harm to copyright holders, such
as a public performance of a copyrighted song in a church service, or the use
of a short clip of a film in a public presentation to illustrate a viewpoint.
Copyright holders’ negative responsibility to allow harmless uses of
their works is first justified by their role responsibility and the reciprocity
principle, as discussed in Part II. The reciprocity principle requires copy-
right holders to make appropriate contributions to the promotion of the
public interest because they benefited from prior works made available to
the public when they created their works. For example, the consumer of a
new article, film, or television program (in private-use cases) may use new
information therein to develop a new research project, write new film com-
ments, or learn about social and political issues reported by media. Such uses
177 For the idea of positive responsibility, see Pogge, supra note 176, at 131.
178 Based on the free speech values, Professor Christina Bohannan suggests copy-
right law should accommodate harmless use. Bohannan points out that “[a]lthough
the First Amendment sometimes protects even harmful speech, it does not allow the
prohibition of harmless speech.” Bohannan, supra note 162, at 1085. Therefore,
“given the speech value inherent in all kinds of copying, copyright law must be
subject to the same harm requirement as other forms of speech regulation.” Id. at
1087. Moreover, Professor Wendy Gordon has argued similarly, but her argument
is based on a law and economics perspective rather than the ethical perspective
discussed in this article. Wendy J. Gordon, Keynote Address, Harmless Use: Gleaning
from Fields of Copyrighted Works, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2411, 2434 (2009)
(“[C]opyright law should give more honor to harmless uses—uses that produce
results that are Pareto superior to nonuse.”).
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have the effect of disseminating the substance of copyrighted works to audi-
ences that the copyright holders do not intend to reach.
Second, copyright holders, as discussed in Part II, need to fulfill their
role responsibilities to nurture fellow citizens’ cultural power to discuss and
critique social issues. The reason for encouraging dissemination of copy-
righted works must be the hope that they will be consumed, that is,
processed or considered. It is only through consumption of works that copy-
right law can enhance the marketplace of ideas and democratic governance.
A good deal of copying must be done in the process of this consumption.179
As Rebecca Tushnet has argued, copyrighted works permeate human life,
profoundly influencing social and political views. Thus, she has pointed out
that “when moments of political choice do come, our responses are shaped
by the culture around us. As a result, freedom to participate in shaping
culture is an overriding concern of the democratic self-governance view [of
the First Amendment].”180 Similarly, Eugene Volokh has emphasized that
in many cases of copyright infringement, the copied “work is materially
more valuable to readers than the original that they can’t get, that costs too
much, or that they don’t know about.”181
All these uses of copyrighted works are largely harmless to copyright
holders because users do not come into any direct or indirect competition
with copyright holders. Uses of copyrighted works, either in private or pub-
lic settings as discussed above, do not reach the market in which copyright
holders issue licenses and charge royalties for others to use their works.
b. The Enforcement of Negative Responsibilities
Copyright limitations should be designed to adequately enforce copy-
right holders’ negative responsibilities. Otherwise, copyright holders may
ignore their responsibilities and gain unfettered control over harmless uses
of their works. They may do so by simply claiming that their copyrights
entitle them to authorize (or prevent) any uses of their works by others.
179 Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Most honest citizens
in the modern world frequently engage, without hesitation, in trivial copying that,
but for the de minimis doctrine, would technically constitute a violation of law.”).
180 Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535, 540 (2004).
181 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred,  44 Liquormart, and  Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 697, 726 (2003).
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Without their authorization, harmless use still amounts to an infringement
of copyright.182
The fair use doctrine codified in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act
does not contain effective safeguards to enforce negative responsibilities. The
problem largely stems from the treatment of fair use as an affirmative de-
fense. First, under the affirmative defense mode of fair use, a user has the
burden of proving he or she did not harm the copyright holder’s market.183
Copyright holders do not need to prove the existence of harm to their mar-
ket when they establish the prima facie case for copyright infringement.
Therefore, it is procedurally and economically easy for copyright holders to
sue users whose uses are harmless to copyright holders’ markets. The burden
of proving the absence of market harm is troublesome for users, as it is not
easy for them to obtain data about copyright holders’ market and examine
the market impact of their uses on copyright holders. This asymmetry be-
tween copyright holders and users concerning the burden of proof may deter
users from making fair uses of works even though they are harmless to copy-
right holders.
An additional barrier to enforcement is the fact that courts have
deemed the market value of the copyrighted work as one of the most impor-
tant factors weighing against fair use, and yet have broadly defined the scope
of copyright holders’ markets.  In Folsom v. Marsh, a decision regarded as the
origin of the modern fair use doctrine, Justice Story emphasized the finding
of the actual harm to copyright holders in fair use cases, because liability
only turns on “the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or dimin-
ish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”184 The mar-
ket value was later codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act as the
fourth factor of the fair use analysis. Courts have regarded this factor as most
important in the fair use analysis.185  By hailing the “market value” factor as
182 See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871, 1898 (2007)
(“The conventional analysis would tell us that when those uses involve a fixed re-
production, an adaptation, or a public distribution, performance, or display, then
they infringe copyright unless they are excused by the fair use privilege codified in
§ 107.”).
183 See Sun, supra note 13, at 134–42.
184 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
185 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985) (finding that the effect on the market is “undoubtedly the single most im-
portant element of fair use.”); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs.,
Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996) (“We take it that . . . ‘the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,’ is at least primus
inter pares . . . .”); see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 617 (2008) (“59.0% of the opinions
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“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,”186 Harper &
Row foreclosed fair use by primarily weighing the individual interest in ac-
cessing and using works against the copyright holder’s economic interest in
the marketability of their works.187 Therefore, the Harper & Row decision
ignored the fact that the defendant’s quoting three hundred to four hundred
words of the former president’s manuscript was vital to lending authenticity
to its reporting on the resignation and pardon of former president Richard
Nixon. Keeping the public informed of the details of that historical event
undoubtedly “furthered the public interest”188 in “[a] broad dissemination
of principles, ideas, and factual information [that] is crucial to the robust
public debate and informed citizenry.”189
Following the responsibility policy, the consideration of copyright
holders’ negative responsibilities must become part of fair use analysis, espe-
cially as part of the fourth factor about the use’s impact on the copyright
holder’s market. Courts should allow uses of works that would cause no
harm to copyright holders’ market and justify such uses on the grounds that
copyright holders have negative responsibilities to allow the public to make
these types of uses.
2. Collective Responsibilities
Copyright law should also promote copyright holders’ collective re-
sponsibilities. In contrast to negative and positive responsibilities that are
attributed to the copyright holder on an individual basis, collective respon-
sibilities require all copyright holders to share common burdens. Responsi-
bilities of this kind are collective because copyright holders are regarded as
sharing two kinds of common identities: first, as social members who receive
benefits from social cooperation for copyright protection; second, as social
members who perform the role of shaping people’s cultural power. These
two common identities, to a certain degree, make the relevant responsibili-
ties imposed on copyright holders collectively sharable. Copyright holders
should collectively take responsibility to bear the burdens of social coopera-
following Harper & Row (but preceding Campbell) explicitly cited [the fact that the
Supreme Court declared the effect of use on the market as the most important
factor] . . . . Of the opinions following Campbell, 26.5% continued explicitly to state
that factor four was the most important factor.”).
186 471 U.S. at 566.
187 Through this emphasis on the protection of the copyright holder’s economic
interest, the Court applied “an exceedingly narrow definition of the scope of fair
use.” Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 591.
189 Id. at 582.
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tion for copyright protection in proportion to the benefits they receive from
this system.
Copyright holders’ collective responsibilities take two forms. The first
type of responsibilities are concerned with accommodating uses of copy-
righted works that are permissible under copyright limitations, such as the
fair use exception and first-sale exception. This collective responsibility deals
only with the relationship between copyright holders and state institutions,
including Congress, courts, and the Copyright Office. When these state in-
stitutions offer a legitimate reason for expanding the scope of copyright lim-
itations, all copyright holders have the responsibility to bear the extra
burden to allow the public to use their works within the expanded scope of
copyright limitations.
The second collective responsibility is the responsibility to reconsider
the relationship between the market in exploiting works and the public in-
terest. Copyright holders are accustomed to treating their exclusive rights as
marketable rights, which means that it is through the license-and-payment
transactions in the marketplace that they maximize the commercial value of
their works. They hail the market as the panacea for curing a host of public
goods problems. Under this rubric, clearly defined rights to exclude are
taken for granted as the core element of copyright law.190 Those copyright
doctrines that protect exclusive rights have been shaped by these theories.
For example, the Supreme Court stated in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Company that the sole measure of quality in copyright law is the market’s
willingness to pay.191 In the Court’s words, “if they command the interest of
any public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to say that they
have not an aesthetic and educational value—and the taste of any public is
not to be treated with contempt.”192 This approach foregrounds a voluntary
author-audience exchange for money. It makes the sale of copyrighted works
in the marketplace both normal and good.
However, copyright holders should take responsibility to consider how
and why the market-based mode of exploiting copyrighted works may cause
social inequalities. According to Robert Hale, the so-called “free market” is
by no means free of coercion; rather, the property-based coercive power is
immanent in the marketplace. While every person has an equal nominal
190 Assessing the Economic Impact of Copyright Reform on Authors, Makers, Photogra-
phers and Publishers in Canada in Reference to Two New Copyright-Related Treaties, avail-
able at www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippd-dppi.nsf/eng/ip01141.html (pointing out that “a
well functioning market for copyrights requires that those copyrights be clearly
defined, affirmed and enforced”).
191 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
192 Id. at 251.
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status as a trading participant in the marketplace, the type and amount of
resources that they control, in fact, differ from one person to another. There-
fore, the bargaining power they have when negotiating deals in the market-
place always varies from person to person, making it possible that people
with stronger bargaining power can coerce others into following their
commands.193
In this context, one of the pressing issues copyright holders should
collectively consider is whether they should take the responsibility to ac-
commodate or even promote the user-based and open access-oriented modes
of innovation, which have flourished in the digital age.194 The free software
movement, the Creative Commons initiative, and a series of new media
projects like Wikipedia and YouTube all challenge the conventional ways of
exploiting copyright that put the copyright holder on the top of the infor-
mation hierarchy. These movements have generated sharp criticisms of, and
creative alternatives to, the conventional model of copyright protection.
It is worth noting that the first type of copyright holders’ collective
responsibilities should be legally enforceable. This means that it is a legal
responsibility. If a copyright holder refuses to accommodate public uses of
his works permissible under the expanded scope of copyright limitations, he
would be held legally liable for misusing his copyright. In this scenario, the
copyright misuse doctrine195 can be invoked to penalize the copyright holder
concerned. By contrast, the second type of copyright holders’ collective re-
sponsibility is a non-legally enforceable moral responsibility. It follows that
copyright holders would not be legally penalized if they fail to consider the
viability of open-access modes of generating innovation and take measures to
accommodate them. However, copyright holders may be morally at fault for
their failure to adapt to changing circumstances by promoting open access
and ameliorating social inequalities.
193 See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470 (1923).
194 See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the
Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369 (2002); William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of
User Innovation, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1417, 1418–23 (2010); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?: Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual
Property Paradigm, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1437, 1443–1447 (2010).
195 See, e.g., Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that if the right holder uses his copyright “in a manner adverse to of
the public policy embodied in copyright law,” his conduct would amount to copy-
right misuse).
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CONCLUSION
We live in an age of irresponsibility.196 The prevalence of the commer-
cial culture in our contemporary society compels many people to relentlessly
pursue their own interests. There are fewer and fewer people who may take
their responsibilities as seriously as John D. Rockefeller Jr.  did decades ago.
He said that he “believe[d] that every right implies a responsibility; every
opportunity, an obligation; every possession, a duty.”197
This Article reveals that the traditional mode of copyright protection
has bred a widespread irresponsibility mentality among many copyright
holders. To address this problem, this Article calls for the integration of
responsibilities in copyright law as a quid pro quo for granting exclusive
rights to copyright holders.
The imposition of responsibilities on copyright holders, however, is not
intended to undermine their creative inputs or to appeal for “the death of
authors.”198 Instead, it is designed as an ethical initiative to foster and pro-
mote a more creative and dynamic way to interpret the nature of copyrights.
This ethical initiative still champions the cause for copyright protection as a
means of securing self-actualization for authors, as expressed in Virginia
Woolf’s call that “a woman must have money and a room of her own if she
is to write fiction.”199
Meanwhile, the ethics of responsibility further highlights the need for
copyright holders to recognize the socially-conditioned nature of the crea-
tion and dissemination of their copyrighted works, to reimagine their proper
roles in shaping people’s cultural power, and to rethink any social inequali-
ties that copyright protection may bring about. This requires copyright
holders, legislators, regulators, and judges to engage in deliberating about
these ethical issues.
If the language of rights opens the avenue for each individual to pursue
freedom and self-actualization on their own, the language of responsibilities
intends to guide each individual to explore collectively the greatness of be-
ing a social member for the common good of society.  In the context of
copyright law, the language of responsibility would function to unite copy-
right holders with users of copyrighted works to reimagine the role of copy-
196 See generally Veitch, supra note 29; Iris Marion Young, Responsibility
for Justice 25 (2011) (“Many relatively privileged people behave irresponsibly in all
kinds of ways.”)
197 Robert T. Grimm, Notable American Philanthropists: Biographies of
Giving and Volunteering 265 (2002).
198 See generally Barthes, supra note 121.
199 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own 4 (2001).
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right law in the digital age. It is an age in which the ethics of responsibility
should be hailed an intrinsic human value that undergirds copyright law.
Therefore, the law’s embracement of copyright holders’ responsibilities with
their rights would serve as the path through which people can act in concert
and then make wonders for the continuity of human civilization.200
200 Hannah Arendt, On Violence 44 (1970) (“Power corresponds to the human
ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an
individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group
keeps together.”).
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